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Abstract:  
This study investigates the impact on macro-economic variables of oil price shocks for net oil 
exporters in Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA).  Yearly observations from 1980 to 2014 are used to analyse 
the impact of unexpected oil price shocks and determine the effects of these shocks on a number 
of macroeconomic country indicators using a structural vector autoregession (SVAR) 
methodologyi.   The findings showed that some variables respond to shocks positively, whilst 
others showed negative responses. The relationship between variations in oil prices, country 
corruption and the country-specific borrowing patterns of these oil exporting SSA countries 
where also found to be correlated.  
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1. Introduction: 
Due to the heavy dependence of many world economies on oil production and supply it is not 
surprising that one may observe significant sensitivity to sudden changes in crude oil prices.  Oil 
price volatility has substantially increased since the early 2000’s, as is depicted in Figure 1.   
 
Figure 1 Oil price volatility Brent Crude Oil Spot Price (data source Bloomberg, 2016)  
 
 
 
By examining time series changes in the price of oil one may see that there are both upward and 
downward price oscillations of different magnitudes. Some of these will have little or no impact 
on the macro-economic variables and wealth of various countries.  However, countries whose 
economies are dependent on the importation or exportation of oil may experience a significantly 
devastating impact on country prosperity and citizen wealth as a result of sudden oil price 
changes.  The sensitivity of a specific country to fluctuations in oil prices, particularly to an 
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unexpected price change, is dependent on the country status as being a net oil importer or 
exporter.   
 
Existing research largely focuses upon positive price shocks on developed countries that are net 
importers (Mendoza and Vera 2010).  There is considerably less published research on downward 
oil price shocks and the impact on net exporting economics and, in particular, developing 
economies.  Mendoza and Vera (2010) document an asymmetric reaction to oil price shocks.  Oil, 
as a major source of energy, is important to both the overall world economy and country-specific, 
macroeconomic variables such as GDP, equity markets, and inflation as well as the business cycle. 
As an important input to most industries and economies of the world, energy plays a central role 
in the global economy. Accordingly, any altering of energy sources which increases energy price 
movement either positive or negative increases uncertainty in the oil market. It appears difficult 
to ascertain a definitive description of an oil price shock in the literature, however, Huntington 
(2005) differentiates between higher oil prices and oil price shocks.  He argues that when “oil 
prices move steadily higher but not rapidly over consecutive months it is merely higher oil prices 
while an oil price shock is when oil prices move rapidly upward over consecutive months” 
(Huntington 2005). 
 
The fluctuations in crude oil prices result in differing short and long run repercussions for various 
countries, which is dependent on their oil importing or exporting status. This impact has been 
examined by numerous studies (Basher, 2012; Effiong, 2014; Fowowe & Iwayemi, 2011; 
Henriques & Sadorsky, 2011; Mehrara & Mohaghegh, 2011; Omojolaibi, 2013). This existing 
literature focuses on the detrimental impact of oil-price shocks for developed economies and 
some developing economies.  However, limited empirical studies focus upon the impact of oil 
price shocks on the SSA exporting oil regions. This study adds to the literature by examining the 
magnitude of the impact on the macroeconomic variables of oil exporting countries in the SSA to 
oil-price shocks.  
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SSA 1 is considered the fastest growing oil-producing region worldwide. According to Africa 
development bank and IMF (2013), SSA oil production has risen by 40 per cent over the past 
decade. Despite the rise in oil production, citizens of oil production countries such as Nigeria, 
Angola, Cameroun and Gabon live in extreme poverty.  This study also investigates the 
government borrowing pattern of these oil-exporting countries during upward oil-price shock 
periods, to examine if these borrowings have had any adverse effect on the macro-economy, 
possibly contributing to the poverty of its citizenry. The study further investigates if there is any 
correlation between the occurrence of oil-price shocks and corruption in oil-exporting countries 
using Corruption Perception Index data. 
 
The specific exporters of oil in the SSA are Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Congo Republic, Equatorial 
Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria, South Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire and recently Ghana. The selection of these 
countries is based on the availability of data. South Sudan was removed from the analysis due to 
lack of data as a result of emerging from a long civil war and then the occurrence of a large growth 
rate of 24%, causing South Sudan to be an outlier in the analysis.  
 
Oil is the backbone of most oil-exporting countries within the SSA economy according to the 
International Monetary fund (2011). Exploratory prospecting in the SSA region is of growing 
importance and includes recent large discoveries of oil in Angola, Nigeria, and Equatorial Guinea, 
and new discoveries in Uganda and Ghana (IMF, 2011). In 2013 alone, the revenue of the eight 
largest oil countries in SSA was approximately US$65 billion (African Development Bank, 2009). 
The potential for oil revenues to boost economic growth in the SSA region is significant. This 
creates possibilities to promote economic diversification, which may enhance higher and stable 
economic growth. However, this is dependent on sound administration and equitable policies 
regarding oil revenue allocation to ensure this opportunity is not squandered or misappropriated. 
As pointed out by the African Development Bank (2009) “the key challenge for harnessing oil 
                                                          
1 SSA countries include Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, 
The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
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resources is making the right strategic choices and synchronizing their implementation in a 
context that supports fiscal prudence and minimizes macroeconomic distortions”.  
 
Challenges facing the oil-producing SSA countries include ensuring a sustainable supply of oil, at 
competitive market prices. Several issues exist that have hindered the achievement of this goal, 
including volatile oil prices and shocks. To enhance energy security in the region, which is a 
challenge, there should be a growing interdependent partnership among all stakeholders 
between net importing and net exporting countries in SSA (African Development Bank, 2009).  
Over the years, oil-price shocks have been the subject of many writers. Several studies find oil 
prices impact on both economic growth and activity (Brown & Yücel, 2002; Kilian & Park, 2009; 
Mehrara & Mohaghegh, 2011; Peersman & Van Robays, 2012). 
Oil price shocks are price fluctuations resulting  from “changes in either the demand or supply 
side of the international oil market” (James D Hamilton, 1983).  Disruption in supply of oil include 
OPEC quotas and production, political unrest in the Middle East, militant action from groups like 
Boko Haram in the Niger Delta of Nigeria, and fighting in South Sudan. Such disruptions can cause 
changes in the international oil market.  Oil price shocks may be both positive and negative with 
varying consequential impacts on the macroeconomic indicators for both exporting and 
importing countries. For example, inflation, money supply and huge fiscal deficits could be 
impacted.  
During the 1970’s, recession experienced by both the US and some Europeans countries was 
preceded by oil shocks caused by the Middle East conflicts. A subsequent rise in research focusing 
on the impact of oil price shocks on macro economies followed.  Studies (Barrell, Delannoy, & 
Holland, 2011; Chevallier, 2013; Omojolaibi, 2013) each “found a significant negative effect 
between oil-price shocks and GDP suggesting that oil shocks were responsible for economic 
recessions” (James D Hamilton, 1983).    
Farzanegan and Markwardt (2009), Fowowe and Iwayemi (2011) and Barrell et al.( 2011) focus 
on the economic impact of positive oil price shocks in developed oil importing countries. Few, if 
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any, of such studies that have been done focus on oil exporting counties particularly in the SSA 
region.  Oil-price shocks can affect the macro-economy of developing oil-exporting countries 
within the SSA region through a number of different avenues. For instance, an oil boom for the 
oil-exporting SSA region will stimulate economic activities from both the demand and supply 
sides.  An oil-price shock poses new challenges for oil-importing countries including impacting on 
exchange rates as well as the circulation and level of revenue from both exports and imports. The 
price of oil fluctuates due to changes in the demand on the world market, which affects 
economies of countries that import and export oil. Various studies that explore oil-price shock 
impacts, both in oil importing and exporting economies, reveal the importance of variation in 
crude-oil prices (Al-Rjoub, 2005; Barrell et al., 2011; Kilian & Park, 2009; Mehrara & Mohaghegh, 
2011). 
 
The most significant impact for oil exporting countries is government expansion of fiscal policy 
via their use of petrol dollars to finance expenditure from oil exporting revenues. This is 
supported by evidence from Brown and Yucel (2002), showing a link between “oil price changes 
and aggregate economic activity”. They found “that an oil price shock leads to a decline in real 
GDP, increases in the federal funds rate and other interest rates, and an increase in the price 
level” (Brown and Yucel, 2002). 
 
The considerable crude oil resources in SSA can, if properly managed, help accelerate growth in 
the region. Large upward oil price shocks provide an excellent opportunity for “oil exporting 
countries to increase revenues and achieve economic growth” (African Development Bank and 
African Union 2009).  However, for oil-dependent importing countries, upward price shocks can 
stifle economic growth through increasing cost burdens.  A number of studies have shown that 
energy consumption makes a significant contribution to the economic growth in SSA (African 
Development Bank and African Union 2009). Petroleum consumption forms an integral part of 
SSA energy mix, as evidenced by statistical records from the World Bank database. These show 
“petroleum consumption as a percentage of total energy consumption over the past few years 
was above 50% and in the neighbourhood of 70% onwards” (African Development Bank, 2009). 
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Therefore, oil-price shocks could have significant impact on the macroeconomic variables for 
those exporting and importing countries in SSA.  
 
Hamilton (1983) also found evidence of a strong correlation between oil-price increases and 
successive economic downturns in the United States (US) during the post-World War Two period.   
Gounder and Bartleet (2007) further demonstrate the association between oil price shocks and 
the impact on macroeconomic variables.  The impact of macroeconomic distortions and fiscal 
prudence could be minimized from oil and gas price shocks if government policies are 
implemented to buffer the impact of unexpected shocks. Oil is a non-renewable resource, and 
plays a pivotal role in the SSA region because it is an indispensable input for growth and economic 
development.  
 
Research shows that “energy consumption per capita is strongly correlated with the level of 
economic and social progress” (IMF, 2008). Energy, particularly from oil consumption, plays a 
pivotal role in the economic growth and development of most countries. In Africa, consumption 
of global commercial energy is only 3 per cent while it has about 15 per cent of world population. 
Its share in the production of energy is about 12 per cent and growing rapidly. Increasing demand 
from China and India, coupled with a lack of expansion in refinery capacity or any spare capacity 
in major producing economies, are major determinants of increasing oil prices between 2000 and 
2009 (African Development Bank, 2009). In 2008, the IMF expected “oil production in the SSA to 
rise at an average rate of 6 per cent, per year for the foreseeable future”. However, recent world 
events have seen a dramatic decrease in the price of oil by up to 60% or more, making many of 
these forecasts redundant at least in the short term.  Nigeria, Angola, and Sudan hold the majority 
(70 per cent) of oil reserves (and production) in SSA.   
 
Sizable amounts of oil have been discovered in Albertine and Tanzania, Graben near Uganda, as 
well as offshore western Ghana and other parts of SSA  (African Development Bank, 2009). 
All of these countries are considered developing economies that face significant economic and 
social challenges with much of the region’s population in poverty.  The great challenge for these 
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oil-producing SSA nations is to effectively develop this natural resource in a sustainable way to 
enrich their citizens without harming the environment whilst being competitive on world oil 
markets. In the instance of positive oil-price shocks, developing exporting countries borrow from 
other countries like China as well as the World Bank to ramp up extraction and development of 
their resources in order to improve their standard of living and the country’s prosperity.  This, in 
itself, is not a problem; except during periods where extreme negative volatility causes a 
significant decrease in the country’s economy, which is exacerbated by the effect of the leverage.  
The recent negative volatility in oil prices, combined with the increasing dependency on both oil 
consumption and oil exports of many SSA countries, significantly weakens their economies and 
increases political instability.   Sustainable management including the level of sustainable foreign 
borrowing to develop the regions oil resources for the benefit of all need to be addressed in the 
SSA regions to achieve the transition from a developing economy into a more prosperous, 
developed and stable economy (African Development Bank, 2009). 
 
Oil price variation will change the cash flow between exporting and importing nations, subject to 
the proportional oil revenue and expenditure in their economies, respectively. Government 
revenue for oil exporting countries increases when there is a rise in oil prices.  However, increased 
production will in the long term produce an oversupply in the market due to higher prices.  
Subsequently, demand for oil will drop due to these higher prices when alternative sources of 
energy come on line. This study adds to the literature by focusing on the impact of oil price shocks 
on the macro-economic variables of the net crude oil exporting countries in the developing SSA 
region.   
1.1 Motivation for the study 
Existing studies indicate that oil price variation changes the flow of funds of the oil exporting 
countries in the SSA. When oil prices rise, government revenue increases temporarily for these 
exporting countries.  In the long term it fades due to high prices that will cause demand to fall.  
Bernanke (2004) argues that positive oil price shocks tend to lower the value added to the 
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economy as firms suspend investments while they determine if price changes are permanent or 
transitory.    
The direction of the oil price shock has been associated with differing impacts on various 
countries’ economies. These impacts are contingent upon whether a country is a net exporter or 
importer and also whether the direction of the oil price shock is positive or negative.  For example, 
Ghana recently experienced the adverse impact of electricity rationing due to the high crude oil 
price. This country uses crude oil to generate electricity and, as the oil price moved upward, the 
government could no longer afford the crude oil to fuel the power stations and had to resort to 
rationing electricity. The electricity issue forced major multinational corporations and companies 
to close down thus affecting the Ghana economy.  These impacts took the form of a decrease in 
government revenue from the collection of taxes, a decrease in investment, a high employment 
rate, massive poverty, and a lack of infrastructural development in the country.  
 
This study examines the borrowing pattern of government debt during positive or negative crude 
oil price shock periods as a possible cause of continuing poverty in the region.  A partial 
motivation for this study is to examine the reasons for massive poverty in the SSA region when 
there are abundant natural resources including crude oil, gold, and other rich minerals. Given the 
lack or limited studies in context to SSA, this research contributes to existing literature on crude-
oil-price shocks and their impacts on macro-economic variables by focusing on developing 
countries and not on developed economies, where most of the literature situates its research. 
Also the majority of the existing literature either examines impacts from importing or exporting 
country dimensions for single-country studies. This study broadens the single country context by 
conducting a cross-countries study focusing on oil exporting SSA and the impact crude oil price 
shocks have on their economies.  The inclusion of exogenous variables like corruption and 
political instability, which are common in SSA, is a further extension to the existing literature. This 
research suggests these governance variables will increase the sensitivity of economies to oil 
shocks in the sub region of Africa.  
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A recent article on a Ghana website stated that “Nigeria’s stolen crude exceeds Ghana daily 
production” (www.naijafeed.com). The article pointed out that “missing excess crude amounts 
to $1 billion or 400,000 barrels of oil stolen over and above recorded daily production”. Ghana 
produces 120,000 barrels per day. The article claims that “there are many challenges confronting 
Nigeria, as the largest oil producing country in SSA, but the largest problems are oil theft and 
corruption. Nigeria also faces challenges such as poverty with over 112 million Nigerians 
categorised as extremely poor. While it is the largest economy in Africa, it is one of the 33 poorest 
countries in the world” (www.infoplease.com).  High rates of infant mortality also plague the 
region with “3.9 million children dying between 2009 and 2014. In addition 55,000 Nigerian 
women die every year, 110,000 deaths are a result of diseases, and 10.4 million children are out 
of school. Over 80 per cent of Nigerian graduates are jobless or unemployed” 
(www.Ghanaweb.com).  
 
The contrast between oil-rich African nations and the extreme poverty experienced by the 
African people is perplexing. Most African oil exporters are plagued with poor economies with 
“low rates of GDP growth, low per-capita incomes (whether measured by parity purchasing 
power or GNI), poor performance in non-oil sectors, and civil violence and war” 
(www.Ghanaweb.com). World Bank data confirms that levels of corruption among Africa oil 
producing countries are some of the worst in the world: Angola, Cameroon, and Nigeria ranking 
among the most corrupt in the world. “According to the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) de 
Transparency International, 31 from 47 African countries, many of which are oil exporters, scored 
below 3 (on a scale of 1 to 10), indicating rampant corruption” 
(http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview  see corruption index in Appendix). 
 
1.2 Research Questions: 
The following three research questions are investigated to address the issues identified above. 
a) What is the impact of oil price shocks on macroeconomic variables of all oil exporting 
countries in SSA?  
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b) Examine the borrowing pattern of oil exporting SSA countries during oil price shocks.  
c) Examine the correlation between oil price shocks, country corruption and country GDP. 
1.3 Research Objectives: 
One of the main sources of financing physical and social infrastructures, in the SSA region is oil 
revenue. The growing reliance on oil revenue causes the impact of oil shocks to be substantial on 
a country’s macroeconomic variables.  This has resultant ramifications for oil exporters’ monetary 
and fiscal policy, economic activities and in turn political stability. For these countries, the “oil 
income that accrues to the governments will have significant effects on the economic 
performance with regards to its impacts on government expenditure, money supply, inflation, 
real exchange rate and imports” (Sturm, Gurtner, & Gonzalez, 2009). Although there is some 
single-country studies that examine the impacts from oil price shocks on developing economies, 
this is the first study to examine multi-country impacts within a region. Further, while most 
previous research deals with the impact of oil shocks on the economy for oil importing countries 
(James D Hamilton, 1983), little or no research has been done on the oil exporting SSA countries 
therefore creating a gap in the literature.  
This research investigates the impact of oil price shocks on macroeconomic variables of 
developing oil exporting countries in SSA.2  Despite the lack of previous studies that focus on the 
SSA region, this research opens avenues to understand how to better utilise oil revenues for the 
growth of this economy and promote the well-being of its citizens. Moreover, the research 
endeavours to provide a better understanding of investment opportunities for foreign capital 
and promote greater economic prosperity in the SSA region.  This, is turn, will assist policy makers 
to stabilise the economies of countries within the region and improve the standard of living for 
the entire population.  
 
The study proceeds as follows. Section 1 provides an introduction and the motivation for the 
study and specifies the research questions and objectives addressed in this thesis. Section 2 
                                                          
2 SSA is Sub Saharan Africa, excludes countries from North Africa. 
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provides an overview of the existing oil price shock literature on macroeconomic variables and 
the theoretical framework. The research methodology, models, data selection, and variables 
description are presented in Section 3. Section 4 presents and discusses the results including the 
descriptive statistics and the main findings. Section 5 provides a conclusion to the study and 
summarises its contributions and recommendations. 
 
2. An overview of the literature 
In the past thirty years, numerous studies have examined the relationship between oil price 
shocks and the impacts on economic variables of particular sets of countries or a specific country. 
These studies used different methodologies which produced different conflicting results over 
different time periods and countries.  Examples of conflicting results of these studies varies 
according to whether the country is either a developed or an emerging economy and whether 
they are oil exporters or importing economies. The focus has been on high oil prices usually 
leading to a decline over time in the supply of oil as demand drops; production requiring oil as a 
major energy declines due to it becoming too expensive an input. Various US studies such as 
James D. Hamilton (2009) and Anzuini, Pagano, and Pisani (2007) indicate that “oil shocks have 
inflationary effects on the developed economies”. Baumeister and Peersman (2008) state that 
“oil production has a huge impact on oil prices and much higher effects on both GDP and 
consumer prices in the US economy”.  
 
James D Hamilton (1983) examined the impact of oil price shocks on the US economy from 1948 
to1972 using six variables to estimate the effect of relatively high oil prices, whereby the results 
suggested that “seven out of eight recessions during this period were caused by oil price shocks 
and these shocks decreased US output growth”.  Other studies have contributed to this evidence 
suggesting “upward oil price shocks have strong and negative consequences for oil importing 
countries” (Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez (2005), Peersman and Robays, (2012), Du, Yanan and 
Wei, (2010), Filis, Degiannakie and Floros, (2011) Wang, Wu and Yang, (2013)). U.S aggregate 
economic activity seemed to retard due to rising oil prices but failed to be stimulated when oil 
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prices were falling.  This indicates that developed economies such as the U.S. do not respond 
symmetrically to both upward and downward oil price shocks.  Mork (1989), on examining 
aggregate oil price shocks, failed to find a “significant relationship between oil and GDP”.  
However, when Mork separately examined upward and downward oil price changes he found “a 
significant relationship between high oil prices and GDP”. Brown and Yucel (2002) stated that 
“rising oil prices signal the increased scarcity of the commodity which is a basic input to 
production that impacts output growth and reduces productivity”.  This, in turn, negatively 
affects real income growth causing unemployment and inflation to increase. 
  
Papapetrou (2001) applied a Vector Auto-regression (VAR) approach to examine the “dynamic 
relationship among oil prices, real stock prices, interest rates, real economic activity and 
employment for Greece”. His results found that “oil price changes affect real economic activity 
and employment and were important factors in explaining stock price movement”.  Sadorsky 
(1999) examined the impact on stock market returns of oil-price shocks, using unrestricted VAR. 
His study covered the period from January 1947 to April 1996 using US monthly data. He 
concluded that “oil-price shocks have asymmetric economic effects” (Sadorsky, 1999) and 
emphasised the importance of oil prices in regards to the behaviour of macroeconomic variables 
of a country.     
 
Al-Rjoub (2005) investigated the US stock market reaction to changes in oil prices using a 1985 
to 2004 dataset.  He employed three econometric techniques in his research: the VAR model; 
mixed Dynamic; and, Granger Causality. These three methods used gave the same results, 
indicating when there is a change in oil price, stock markets react negatively. The results from 
Granger causality indicated that “there exist bi-directional effects of stock markets and oil price 
shocks”,  as such “both stock market returns and oil price shocks cause each other” (Al-Rjoub, 
2005). 
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Gounder and Bartleet (2007) examined oil price shocks and economic growth for New Zealand,  
an oil importing country, using quarterly data from 1989 to 2007. VAR methodology was used in 
their studies; in particular a “multivariate framework to measure the short-term impact of oil 
price shocks on economic growth, inflation, real wage and exchange rate” (Gounder & Bartleet, 
2007). They found that the impact of oil price change was significant when there was linear and 
asymmetric oil price increase.  “Using the Granger Causality test, impulse response function and 
variance decomposition they concluded that oil price shocks have direct impact on economic 
growth an indirect impact through exchange rate and inflation” (Grounder & Bartleet, 2007). 
 
Eltony and Al-Awadi (2001) and Al-mulali, Sab, and Binti (2011) examined oil exporting countries 
in the middle east characterised by small open economies.  Eltony and Al-Awadi (2001)  examined 
the effect of oil price movement on the economy of Kuwait and found oil price shocks impact the 
demand for money, despite Kuwait monetary policy influence on economic activity being 
minimal. Al-mulali et al. (2011) investigated the “impact of oil price shocks on Qatar’s economy 
using data from 1970 to 2000”.  This study used four variables including GDP, inflation, the 
exchange rate and investments, where oil price shocks have a positive impact on GDP in both 
short and long run. However, they reported an adverse impact in inflation impact on inflation. 
“When there is slow output growth and an increase in the real interest rate, the demand for real 
cash balances fall, and for a given rate of growth in the monetary aggregate, the rate of inflation 
increases. Therefore, rising oil prices reduce GDP growth and boost real interest rates and the 
measured rate of inflation” (African Development Bank, 2009). 
 
Jiménez-Rodríguez and Sanchez (2005) presented both theoretical and empirical support 
regarding the size of price shocks and the impact on economic growth. “The oil price declines in 
the middle of the 1980s impacted the world price of oil causing a linear relationship between oil 
prices and economic growth” (Mork, 1989).  
  
The evidence on net oil importing, developing countries indicates they are more exposed to oil 
shocks than developed countries. This is due to two reasons, mainly because of the less efficient 
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pattern of energy consumption of these countries. As the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2014) 
stated: “oil importing, developing countries use more than twice as much oil to produce one unit 
of output than the OECD countries use”. The second reason is that “these countries are more 
dependent on imported oil than oil producing countries” (African Development Bank and African 
Union, 2009).   
 
Oil prices changes have had a direct impact on investment decisions of firms and households as 
is established by several studies (Ali Ahmed & Wadud, 2011; Kilian, Rebucci, & Spatafora, 2009; 
Mehrara & Mohaghegh, 2011; Naranpanawa & Bandara, 2012). The use of existing capital and 
labour resources and the investment in new physical and human capital may be affected by the 
shocks.  Usually, in net oil exporting countries crude oil price and economic growth are positively 
correlated, while in net oil importing countries they are negatively correlated; however, there 
are some studies that show this relationship is more complicated in Africa. For instance, Fowowe 
and Iwayemi (2011) found “that oil price shocks do not impact on Nigerian output, however, 
lower oil prices significantly reduce their economic activity”. Their results suggest that “oil price 
shocks do not have a major impact on most macroeconomic variables in Nigeria over the period 
1985 to 2007. The results of the Granger-causality tests, impulse response functions, and 
variance decomposition analysis all showed that different measures of linear and positive oil 
shocks have not caused output, government expenditure, inflation, nor the level of the real 
exchange rate. The tests support the existence of asymmetric effects of oil price shocks due to 
the finding that negative oil shocks significantly explain changes to cause output and the real 
exchange rate”. 
 
Umar and Kilishi (2010) investigated the impact of crude oil price changes on four key 
macroeconomic variables in the Nigeria economy over the period 1970 to 2008 using a VAR 
model. They find “oil price changes have a significant impact on real GDP, money supply and 
unemployment”. However, Umar and Kilishi (2010) results found that “the impact on the 
consumer price index was not significant, but the impact on money supply posed a danger to the 
management of the economy since it was a major macroeconomic policy instrument, whereas 
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GDP and unemployment are key macroeconomic policy targets”. If exogenous variables like 
crude oil prices shocks have significant influence on key macroeconomic variables, then it makes 
sense for governments whose economy becomes susceptible to these shocks to mitigate the 
effect by diversifying their economies.  However, even in Australia, a developed nation, we see a 
concentration of investment in the mining sector when commodity prices are high to the neglect 
of other sectors of the economy.  Once commodity prices drop, there is always a scramble to 
invigorate other sectors of the economy. 
 
“While the structure of various economies may affect the extent to which economic growth is 
retarded following a price shock, these findings also imply that oil-price shocks contribute to the 
volatility in most of the countries”(Jiménez-Rodríguez & Sanchez, 2005).  However, for countries 
like the US and Canada, both upward and downward oil shocks have significant impact indicating 
a more symmetric relationship. Oil exporting Norway “exhibits positive price shocks impacting 
growth positively and negative price shocks impacting growth negatively” (Gounder & Bartleet, 
2007). “This may be expected if demand effects (especially the terms of trade effect) are stronger 
than supply effects, particularly in a relatively small economy where oil exports are substantial. 
The literature on energy prices and economic growth suggests that price shocks, especially to oil 
resources, lead to recession. A number of different transmission mechanisms have been asserted, 
consistent with the global nature of energy in modern economies” (Gounder & Bartleet, 2007). 
Gounder and Bartleet (2007) point out that “New Zealand a net oil importer exposes its domestic 
economy to the impact of oil price shocks for the same reasons as other countries”.  
 
Jiménez-Rodríguez and Sanchez (2005) suggests “there is evidence of a non-linear impact of oil 
prices on real GDP growth in both oil importing and exporting countries”, and also states “the 
effects of an increase in oil prices on real GDP growth are found to differ substantially from those 
of an oil price decrease, providing evidence against the linear approach that assumes that oil 
prices have symmetric effects on the real economy”. When prices increases, it has larger 
magnitude of impact on GDP than when the oil price declines, with the latter being insignificant.  
An “increase in oil prices has a significant negative impact on GDP growth in all oil importing 
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countries except Japan…possibly due to the special circumstances undergone by the Japanese 
economy”.(Jiménez-Rodríguez & Sanchez, 2005). The impact of an oil price rise on GDP growth 
are overall strongest for the US, although Germany, France and Italy show similar effects when 
the non-linear modelling was used. They discovered that “a decline in oil prices significantly 
affects only a few countries, having a positive impact on the US and UK economies while doing 
damage to the Canadian economy” (Jiménez-Rodríguez & Sanchez, 2005). 
 
The magnitude of the impact on macroeconomic variables from relatively high oil prices has been 
the subject of much debate (James D Hamilton, 1996; Lee, Ni & Ratti, 1995; Mork, 1989).  
Assessment of the symmetry of macroeconomic effects of oil price movements has been 
investigated separately. Mork (1989) reveals that “there is a correlation between economic 
growth and energy price decreases in the US”, which was significantly different from those where 
there was energy price increases over the post-World War Two periods. This implies an 
asymmetric energy price/economic growth relationship for the US, which is an important finding 
from the economic policy perspective”. Mork (1989) found evidence of asymmetries in the case 
of West Germany, France, the United Kingdom (UK) and Japan. “On the other hand, both oil price 
increases and decreases are significant for the case of the US and for Canada. Norway, as an oil 
exporter, is an exception to this trend, with positive price shocks impacting growth positively and 
negative price shocks impacting growth negatively”.  
 
Bashiri Behmiri and Pires Manso (2013) find that in both “the short and long run there is two-
way causality relationship between crude oil consumption and economic growth for net oil 
importing countries in SSA”. For net oil exporting countries in SSA, Bashiri Behmiri and Pires 
Manso (2013) point out that “in the short run there is uni-directional causality relationship 
between crude oil consumption to GDP growth, however in the long run there is bi-directional 
causality relationship between crude oil consumption and economic growth”. Bashiri Behmiri 
and Pires Manso (2013) conclude that “reduction of crude oil consumption has a negative impact 
on economic growth  for both net importing and exporting countries in SSA”, suggesting that a 
reduction in crude oil consumption without an increase in energy production destroys the 
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development process in SSA. Bashiri Behmiri and Pires Manso (2013) revealed that in order to 
reduce crude oil consumption and decrease oil dependency more attention needs to be focused 
on crude oil efficiencies policy, such as the reduction of oil quantity used by households, 
transportation and industrial sectors to minimise waste.   
Kilian (2008) pointed out that “energy prices in general and crude oil prices in particular have 
been endogenous with respect to U.S macroeconomic conditions as far back as early 1970”. Kilian 
(2008) states that “endogeneity here refers to the fact that not only energy prices affect the U.S 
economy, but that there is reverse causality from U.S and, more generally, global macroeconomic 
aggregate to the price of oil.” The paper showed that “global macroeconomic variables such as 
economic activity and interest rates clearly depend on supply and demand of energy”, stating 
that “correlation between energy prices and macroeconomic outcomes do not necessarily imply 
causation”.  
Kilian (2008),  showed that the issue can be resolved by applying statistical transformation to oil 
prices to extract the exogenous component of the oil price, which leads to an example of the net 
oil price increase approach proposed by Hamilton (2000).  The literature also shows that oil price 
changes do not only come through exogenous shocks, such as supply disruptions due to political 
conflicts or oil producing nations intentionally cutting down supply, but can also be driven by 
endogenous changes in the global macroeconomic aggregates such as inflation, fluctuation in the 
dollar or change in interest rates (Barsky & Kilian, 2004; Bernanke, 2004; Kilian, 2008). Hence, an 
investigation of the origins of an oil price shock transmission into the economy needs to be 
examined as macroeconomic variables could react differently depending on the source of oil 
price shock. 
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Table 1: Summary of Literature 
Study Data Method and Variables Sig
? 
Sadorsky (1999) USA : Monthly data 1947-1996 VAR(Y, SR) Yes 
Papapetrou (2001) Greece: Monthly 1989 to 1996 VAR(R, UN, Y) Yes 
Eltony and Al‐Awadi (2001) Kuwait: Quarterly data 1984-1998  VAR(CPI, MS, GOV, NX, 
OP,) 
Yes 
Hamilton (2005) USA; Quarterly 1948-1994 OLS(Y, OPV, MP, INF, IP) Yes 
Jiménez-Rodríguez* and 
Sanchez (2005) 
9 OECD Countries; 
Quarterly 1972-2001 
VAR 
(Y, OPV, INF, R, W, EX) 
Yes 
Gounder and Bartleet (2007) New Zealand: Quarterly 1989-
2006  
VAR(INF, R, RER, Y) Yes 
Cong, Wei, Jiao, and Fan 
(2008) 
China. Monthly 1996-2007 VAR(SR, INF, R) Yes 
Kilian and Park (2009a) USA : Monthly data 1975-2006  VAR(SR) Yes 
Farzanegan and Markwardt 
(2009) 
Developing economies: Iran 
Quarterly data 1975-2006 
VAR(Gov, INF, R, OPV, EX, 
Co) 
Yes 
Tang, Wu, and Zhang (2010) China. Monthly 1998-2008 SVAR(INF, CP, R) Yes 
Mehrara and Mohaghegh 
(2011) 
12 OPEC countries and 8 Non 
OPEC oil producing countries. 
Yearly data  1985-2005 
VAR(GDP, MS, CP) Yes 
Fowowe and Iwayemi (2011) Nigeria: Quarterly data 1985Q1 to 
2007Q4  
VAR(GDP, INF, GOV, NX, 
RER 
NO 
Ali Ahmed and Wadud (2011) Malaysia: Monthly data 1986-
2009 
SVAR(CPI, Y) Yes 
Emami and Adibpour (2012) Iran: Annual data 1959-2008 SVAR(GOV, R, RER, Y) Yes 
Omojolaibi (2013) Nigeria: Quarterly data 1985q1 - 
2010q4   
SVAR(PR, Y,MS, OP) Yes 
Effiong (2014) Nigeria: Annual data 1995(1)-
2011(12)   
SVAR(SP) Yes 
Notes: VAR is Vector Autoregression, Y is economic growth, MP is Monetary Policy, OP is oil prices, IP is import prices, UN is 
unemployment, W is wages, INF is inflation, R is interest rate, I is investment, OPV is oil price volatility, CP is commodity prices, 
GOV is Government expenditures, EX is exchange rate., SR is stock returns, CO is consumption, GDP is gross domestic product, 
NX is net export, RER is Real Exchange rate, CPI is consumer price index, SP is stock price and MS is of variables within the brackets 
does not reflect the order of the VAR within the above corresponding study. 
 
Table 1 summaries the key literature indicating the data, method and variables used, together 
with significance of findings. 
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3. Theoretical Framework: 
3.1 Theory 
The most persuasive way to achieve poverty reduction in the SSA is through strong 
macroeconomic growth. Over 40% of the Sub Saharan population lives under extreme poverty. 
“Higher oil prices exacerbate the incidence and depth of poverty and highly distort income 
distribution structures” (AFDB 2012). Anyone living under $1.25 a day is considered to be 
extremely poor (IMF, 2008). The relationship between the prosperity of a nation and its citizens 
and its wealth in oil rich resources is complex. For oil dependent countries, oil price shocks may 
lead to a drop in output through two direct effects:  
1) resource constraints directly effecting income, and  
2) decreased production through higher costs of inputs resulting in the fall of labour income 
meaning reduction in household income decreasing investment and creating poverty 
(IMF, 2008). 
One may expect positive oil prices shocks to benefit oil exporters. However, the International 
Monetary Fund asserts that “key economic and social indicators for oil-exporting countries in SSA 
suggest that oil wealth has not been able to support sustained economic growth and 
development. Moreover, inequitable distribution of oil revenue among the population can fuel 
social tensions as has been witnessed in the case of the Niger Delta region” (IMF, 2008). 
There should be “basic good governance principles such as strengthened institutions, 
transparency, accountability and enhanced civil society to enable oil resources to transform into   
wealth, poverty alleviation, human capital, and institutional development in SSA”, which will 
promote growth and investment in the SSA region. 
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Figure 2: Theoretical Framework for Exporting Countries (Increase/Decrease)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Tang, Wu, & Zhang, 2010) 
Figure 2 above illustrates the mechanisms of oil price shocks on macroeconomic variables. A brief 
description of these mechanisms is below: 
• Increase in oil price (supply side effect) impacts directly on output due to change in 
production cost caused by oil shock.  
• Inflation impact is the relationship between the a country’s inflation and oil prices 
• Unemployment and income effect: when output is affected through production cost due 
to oil price shocks, there is a flow-on impact on employment and income of the population 
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of that country. Unemployment is the most important factor affecting the poverty rate. 
Oil shocks causing high levels of unemployment and subsequently the poverty rate. 
• Investment effect: Investigating the change in investment caused by oil price shock.  
• The relationship between PPI, CPI, profitability, standard of living due to oil price shocks. 
• Surpise effect: Volatility and uncertainty about oil prices and its impact on development. 
3.2 The Oil price shock transmission channels   
Hamilton(1983) defines oil price shocks as “price fluctuations as a result of  changes in either the 
demand or supply side of the international oil market”. The oil price shocks themselves can either 
be a sudden unexpected increase or decrease in price. Although there is a perceived benefit 
associated with oil price changes, it could have either a positive or negative impact on the 
macroeconomic variables for both exporting and importing countries. For example, inflation and 
money supply could be impacted and huge fiscal deficits may result. “The oil price increase can 
be measured in absolute terms or as a percentage change and the timing of the shock, that is 
how fast and duration of the price increase” (James D Hamilton, 2003). 
 
Brown and Yücel (2002) theorise that oil price changes affect the performance of macroeconomic 
variables through transmission channels.  When there is oil price shock, “the supply-side impact 
creates immediate economic distortions that hit oil-intensive production sectors. The supply-side 
result is the reduced availability of a key production input (oil) when oil prices rise. Because the 
cost of other production inputs, notably labour, do not fall, the overall per unit cost of production 
rises, leading to reduced output levels. Since output prices do not necessarily rise with increasing 
oil prices, the profit margins of oil-intensive production sectors plummet and may have an overall 
negative effect on the macro economy” (IMF, 2008). Also, “a rise in oil prices leads to 
deterioration in the terms of trade of net oil-importing countries, and, subsequently, to a fall in 
the purchasing power of firms and households in net oil-importing countries” and vice versa for 
oil exporters (IMF, 2008). In turn, this causes decrease in profits and investment for firms, causing 
higher unemployment, lower income for the household which will lead to poverty for the 
countries in SSA region. 
30 
 
 
“Increasing oil prices may lead to increased money demand in net oil-importing countries and 
failure to meet this demand through increased money supply leads to higher interest rates. This 
has negative effects on consumption and investment, leading to lower growth. Consumption is 
affected through its positive relation to disposable income, and investment through increasing 
firm costs” (Tang et al., 2010). When firms are not investing because of oil price shocks it will 
have an impact on infrastructural development; with firms or companies not willing to invest in 
countries with poor infrastructural development, which means lack of job opportunities, this may 
result in massive unemployment and poverty to the SSA region.  
 
Persistent oil price increases may “lead to a change in the production structure in favour of non-
oil intensive sectors, which may lead to other distortions”. When the market reacts to oil price 
increases it can affect the unemployment situation in the long term. Whilst economic 
diversification is still low in most SSA economies, oil price shocks have the potential of disrupting 
the already slow development of these countries.  
 
Oil prices have economic impacts through various channels. Peersman and Van Robays (2009) 
and Barsky and Kilian (2004) describe the effects of a rising oil prices, grouping them into three 
main channels: consumer prices, a direct effect; and indirect impacts on consumer prices through 
production costs and aggregate demand effects. The consumption basket is component of oil 
products; increases in oil prices directly effects consumer price inflation. Expensive oil raises 
production costs for firms. If firms decide to partially or totally pass the cost increase onto their 
consumers by increasing prices of goods, including those not related to energy, this will push up 
core inflation (indirect effect). The magnitude of these two effects together depends on the 
country’s relative position in the oil market, i.e. whether the country is a net-importer or net-
exporter of oil, its level of oil intensity, and the degree of competition within each industry that 
is affected by the oil prices.  
Oil- and net-food-importing, developing countries were severely affected by food and oil price 
shocks in 2007 and 2008 creating a negative impact on poverty, growth and inflation 
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(Naranpanawa & Bandara, 2012).   The sharp rise in the global oil price plays a significant role in 
domestic energy inflation and food inflation in net energy- and food-importing, developing 
countries, which can impact household poverty. These high prices rises lead to macroeconomic 
vulnerabilities, particularly in countries with a high share of oil imports, and increase poverty in 
developing countries, which the SSA region is no exception. Higher oil prices in combination with 
associated higher import prices tend to increase cost of production leading to reduction of 
business profitability. In addition, this will unavoidably lead to higher inflation, which will in turn 
lower the purchasing power of consumers (Kilian and Park, 2009). 
 
Although the above discussion focuses mainly on the impact of positive oil price shocks for oil 
importing countries, the reverse should be observed for net exporters during price increases.  
What is not exactly clear is the impact of sudden negative oil price changes on oil exporting 
countries, particularly after extended periods of price increases that have encouraged excess 
development funded by international borrowing. 
4. Data and Variable Constructions: 
Fowowe and Iwayemi (2011) apply 5 macroeconomic variables (as used by Farzanegan & 
Markwardt, 2009; James D Hamilton, 1983; Mork, 1989), to examine the impact of oil price 
shocks on macroeconomic variables of the Nigerian economy: 
1. Real GDP (Y), 
2. Government expenditure (GOV), 
3. Inflation (INF), 
4. Real exchange rate (RER), and  
5. Net exports (NX). 
James D Hamilton (2005) points out that the “measure of oil price shocks determines the 
functional form of the relationship” and this can sometimes create incorrect model specification. 
This contributes to “inaccurate empirical relationships between oil price shocks and 
macroeconomic variables”. To overcome deficiencies in previous studies, different approaches 
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like SVAR models are more suitable to test for relationships between oil price shocks and 
macroeconomic variables.    
Mork (1989) examined asymmetries in oil price shocks and found both “positive and negative oil 
price shocks”. Oil price change is defined as follows: 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡
+ = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚�0, (𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 − 𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡−1)� 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡
− = 𝑀𝑀𝑜𝑜𝑀𝑀�0, (𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡−𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡−1)� 
where roilpt is the real price of oil at time t, 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡+ the real oil price increase,   𝑚𝑚𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡−the 
real oil price decrease”. 
Similarly a GARCH model may be appropriate “to calculate oil price volatility and arrive at an oil 
shock variable reflecting both the unanticipated component of real oil price movement and the 
time varying conditional variance of oil price change forecasts”.  Lee et al. (1995) used the 
following GARCH (1,1) model to investigate oil shocks: 
𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 = 𝛿𝛿 + �𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘
𝑖𝑖=1
 
𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 = 𝜈𝜈𝑡𝑡�ℎ𝑡𝑡, 𝜈𝜈𝑡𝑡~𝑁𝑁(0,1)  
ℎ𝑡𝑡 = 𝛾𝛾0+𝛾𝛾1𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡−12 + 𝛾𝛾2ℎ𝑡𝑡−1 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 �0, 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡
�ℎ𝑡𝑡
� 
Lee et al. (1995) defines the “oil volatility measure (OILVOL) for positive (OILVOL+) and negative 
(OILVOL-) oil shocks, where OILVOL+ contains all positive values of OILVOL and zero replaces 
negative values and OILVOL- contains all negative values of OILVOL with positive values replaced 
by zero”. 
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Al-Rjoub (2005) investigate oil price changes and its effect using VAR analysis, mixed dynamic 
model and Granger Causality approach. The paper tested for the endogeneity in the model 
variables and the response of stock returns to oil price shocks in the US economy. Al-Rjoub (2005) 
use nominal oil price shocks as the only exogenous variable, using the below equation. 
𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡0 + �𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡−1 + �𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 
Where 
Rt stands for the S&P 500 returns index. 
Rt-1 is the Rt at different lag length. 
OILt-1 is the international crude oil price imported in the U.S  
 The approach by Al-Rjoub (2005)  is use to test for the exogenous variables in the model.  
The Al-Rjoub (2005) used a second model called a dynamic  model which was written as follows: 
𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷(𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅) + 𝑏𝑏2𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡 
Where 
Rt    stands for the S&P 500 returns index 
Rt-1   stands for the lag return length  
According to Al-Rjoub (2005) with the mixed dynamic model the Rt is “the function of its own 
lagged value” and the first difference of oil.  The second model being a mixed dynamic model 
performs better than the first difference model.  The coefficient of the lag in the mixed dynamic 
model is exactly equal to one but in the real world it often happens that the coefficient of the lag 
endogenous variable is statistically different to one, and in those cases mixed dynamic model 
usually perform better than the specification in first differences. 
This research applies the mixed model approach to investigate any lagged endogenous variables.  
34 
 
4.1 Data Issues 
The region under study is the net oil exporting countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. Countries 
included in the sample consist of Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Congo Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria, Ghana, and Sudan. Sudan was removed from the analysis due 
to the fact it is recently emerging from years of civil war and a resultant lack of data availability. 
Sudan’s post war growth rate of 23% causing it to be outlier in the analysis. The time period of 
analysis uses annual data covering the period 1980 to 2014,  
The multivariate model comprises of: 
• real oil price (OP) defined as crude oil prices in real terms; and  
• real GDP (RGDP) defined as GDP at constant price;  
• Unemployment (UNE) measured as percentage of labour force;  
• inflation rate (INF) as measured by the percentage changes of consumer price index, 
• Investment (inv),  
• Real exchange Rate (RER),  
Poverty indicators are the poverty index, poverty Gap. The data was obtained from the IMF 
regional economic outlook database, Bloomberg, World Bank and Quandl websites. 
The study uses simple regressions to analyse the relationship between the macroeconomic 
indicators such as unemployment, inflation and GDP growth and the changes in country poverty 
indicators. The selected macroeconomic variables used in this study are unemployment, 
household income, investment, inflation, real exchange rates, interest rates and household 
poverty.  The natural logarithm of the data observations are used.  The selection criteria including 
the sample period as well as choice of countries is based on the data availability for all the needed 
macroeconomic variables. 
5. Estimation Procedure 
As the data is time series; the unit root Augmented Dickey-Fuller test is performed to determine 
if stationarity is a problem in the variables INV, COP, Emp, INF, INC, Corruption and PVTY. Then  
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a co-integration test was used to determine any long term relationship between the dependent 
and independent variables in this study.  Vector error-correction model (VECM) is used to 
investigate causality between the variables. The VECM models short-run and long-run 
relationships (Gujarati, 2012). 
5.1 Unit Root Test 
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is used to test for stationarity in the data.  
The basic equation for the unit root test is specified as follows: 
yt = α + ρyt-1 + εt                                                                                     ( 2) 
Where yt is the time series, t is the time index, α and ρ are the coefficients and εt is the error 
term. The Dickey-Fuller test is based on the following regression forms: 
1. Without a Constant term and Trend: Δyt = δyt-1 + ut              (3) 
2.   With a Constant term:  ∆yt = α + δ yt-1 + ut                                                     (4) 
3.  With a Constant term and Trend:  ∆yt = α + βT + δ yt-1 + ut               (5) 
The null and alternative hypotheses for each of the three cases are as follows: 
H0: δ = 0 (yt is non-stationary) 
H1: δ < 0 (yt is stationary) 
The decision rule of this test is: 
If τ > DF critical value, we do not reject the null hypothesis, and that means a unit root 
exists, where τ is the t-statistic. 
If τ < DF critical value, we will reject the null hypothesis, i.e., a unit root does not exist” 
(Gujarati, 2012). 
Separate regressions were run for each equation in order to determine the correct 
specification. 
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5.2 Co-integration Test 
 
The SVAR model used to test for co-integration is as follows: 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽 + �𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1 +∈𝑡𝑡 
Where yt is a g-vector of I(1) variables, µ is a g-vector of constants, and εt is a g-vector of white 
noise residuals at time t with zero mean and constant variance.  With macro-economic variables 
it is likely that they will exhibit a long run relationship or what is technically termed co-integrated. 
“If the variables are all I(1) and a linear combination of them is I(0), then the variables are co-
integrated, that is CI(1,1)” Gujarati, 2012). 
The approach by Johansen (1988) and Johanson-Juselius (1990) applied in this study has been 
developed to “test for any long run relationship between the variables in a regression model”. 
The Akaike Information Criteria determines the “length of lag used to implement the JJ procedure 
based on the vector autoregressive (VAR)”. 
 
5.3 Granger Causality Test. 
The Granger approach (1969) tests if the “variable x causes a variable y and how much of the 
current value of y can be explained by past values of y and if adding past values of x can improve 
the explanation of y. The variable x is said to Granger cause variable y if past values of x help in 
the prediction of the present value of y”. 
 
As  literature suggested by Kilian (2014) and Lee et al. (1995), first run a unit root test to test for 
the stationarity of the data, run co-integration test to investigate any co-integration among the 
variables and if there is co-integration among variables then use Vector error correction 
model(VECM), Granger Causality, impulse response function and variance decomposition but if 
there is no co-integration then run vector autoregressive model(VAR) Granger causality , impulse 
response function and variance decomposition for the variables 
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In the instance there is no co-integration between the variables in the model, the “structural 
vector autoregressive (SVAR) model is used to examine the short-run causality between the 
variables” as suggested by Kilian and Park (2009).  As specified by Hoffman and Rasche (1996) 
“the VECM model allows us to capture both the short-run and long-run relationships and the 
direction of the relationship”.  The short-run Granger causality can be established by conducting 
a joint test of the coefficients in the VECM, which is based on the F-test and χ2 test.  The long-
run causal relationship, on the other hand, is implied through the significance of the lagged error 
correction term in the VECM, based on the t test”. (Hoffman & Rasche, 1996) 
 
The impact of oil price shocks on macroeconomic variables for oil exporting SSA is analysed using 
both the impulse response functions and forecast variance decomposition. The impulse response 
analyses assess the direction, magnitude, timing and duration of shocks in the crude oil market. 
The forecast variance decomposition decomposes the forecast error variances and estimates the 
relative importance of various structural shocks. The analysis uses two types of real oil prices for 
robustness checks. 
This paper adopts  a model for oil price change developed by (Mork, 1989) and  extends it by 
finding the oil price shock effects.  Price shocks effects occur when there is a change in price 
compared to the previous period as follows: 
Crude_ oil_ Price_ Shockt= Crude_ oil_ Pricet – Crude_ oil_ Pricet-1 
5.4 Structural VAR Model 
To study the impact of oil price shocks on macroeconomic variables in context to SSA, the 
Structural Vector Autoregressive model (SVAR) is used in this research. The SVAR model offers a 
combination of time series analysis and economic theory to find “responses of macroeconomic 
variables to independent shocks” (Effiong, 2014).   
The structural VAR model is used to examine the impact of oil price shocks on macroeconomic 
variables using the impulse response functions and forecast variance decompositions. Wang et 
al. (2013) and Effiong (2014) justify the reason for using the SAVR model is appropriate is “that 
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the results of impulse responses implied by simple VAR model can be affected by the order of 
variables, SVAR model can help overcome the ordering problem by imposing restrictions on the 
system according to the importance of variables”.  The structural VAR Model applied restrictions 
on the structural parameters where all the zeros restrictions are on the contemporaneous 
structural parameters, with the direct effect of exogenous variables on the endogenous variables 
(Gottschalk, 2001).   
“The SVAR does not impose restrictions on the lagged structural parameters of the matrix but set 
restrictions based on economic theory on the macroeconomic variables into mutually orthogonal 
shocks with structural interpretation when capturing the relationship between variables within 
a linear framework” (Gottschalk, 2001). 
D (OIL) is the first difference in the international crude oil price imported into the US. 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡
+ =(crude oil prices (Cop), employment (EMP), Inflation (INF), investment (inv), 
Income(Inc), new variables: Corruption and Poverty (Pvty).  
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡
− =(crude oil prices (Cop), employment (EMP), Inflation (INF), investment (inv), 
Income(Inc), new variables: Corruption, and Poverty (Pvty) 
This research applies the following model employed by (Ali Ahmed & Wadud, 2011) which is a 
SVAR with the following general form: 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽 + �𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1 +∈𝑡𝑡 
Where: 
𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 = (∆𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡,∆𝑜𝑜𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,∆ 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡∆,𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 ,∆𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡,∆𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡,∆𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡) is a vector including changes in 
Variables. 
𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡  = the logarithm of Real Gross Domestic Product 
𝑜𝑜𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = the logarithm of Investment 
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𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = the logarithm of Poverty  
𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = the logarithm of Political Stability   
𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 = the logarithm of Corruption  
𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 = the logarithm of Employment. 
𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 = the logarithm of real WTI crude oil price 
∆ denotes the first order difference between the value in year t-1 and the year t. 
∈𝑡𝑡  is the exogenous error term in the vector, to be serially and mutually uncorrelated  
structural shocks.  
J is the lag length. 
A is the full rank matrix 
Following Kilian and Park (2009), the structural shocks, 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡  is derived by imposing structural 
innovations,  𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴0−1𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 
Based on the underlying sources of oil price shocks, their effect on economic and non-economic 
variables specified in the structural model form below: 
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 =
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡∆𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡∆𝑜𝑜𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡∆ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡∆𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡∆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡∆𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
=
𝑚𝑚11
𝑚𝑚21
𝑚𝑚31
𝑚𝑚41
𝑚𝑚51
𝑚𝑚61
𝑚𝑚71
0
𝑚𝑚22
𝑚𝑚32
𝑚𝑚42
𝑚𝑚52
𝑚𝑚62
𝑚𝑚72
00
𝑚𝑚33
𝑚𝑚43
𝑚𝑚53
𝑚𝑚63
𝑚𝑚73
000
𝑚𝑚44
𝑚𝑚54
𝑚𝑚64
𝑚𝑚74
0000
𝑚𝑚55
𝑚𝑚65
𝑚𝑚75
00000
𝑚𝑚66
𝑚𝑚76
000000
𝑚𝑚77⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
        
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎 𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟  𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃 
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡   𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃 
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑀𝑀 𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐 𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜 ⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡∆𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡∆𝑜𝑜𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡∆ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡∆𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡∆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡∆𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
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5.5 Results: 
This section discusses the results and analysis of the SVAR model used in this study. Table 1 
reports the descriptive statistics of the panel data for oil exporting countries in SSA.  The Oil price 
mean for the countries showing higher amplitude, whereas other variables have mean close to 
zero. The J-B Statistics shows the normality of the panel data. The results show corruption, CPI 
and Unemployment are negatives, which reflects the changes in these variables have on average 
declined during the time of the study.   
Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics 
                  
  DOILPRICE DLINV DLGDP DCORRUPTION DBORROWING DCPI DDURABLE DUN 
 Mean 2.339 0.074 0.075 -0.022 -0.732 -0.447 0.2061 -0.0633 
 Median 0.497 0.079 0.082 0.000 -0.459 -0.738 1 0 
 Max. 31.760 1.231 0.778 1.000 254.475 1722.981 1 4.7 
 Min. -35.585 -1.883 -0.747 -1.000 -269.347 -3925.931 -38 -6.8 
 Std. Dev. 11.298 0.326 0.198 0.290 38.644 306.983 4.339 0.757 
 Skewness -0.334 -0.464 -0.201 -0.114 0.358 -7.547 -6.682 -3.003 
 Kurtosis 6.288 9.430 4.997 8.574 23.184 121.971 49.138 46.457 
 Jarque-Bera 120.091 448.440 44.793 259.343 4283.087 140822.50 25188.47 14194.05 
 Prob. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 0 
 Sum 598.718 18.977 19.514 -4.417 -184.501 -105.117 54 -11.2 
 Sum Sq Dev. 32550.310 26.989 10.119 16.722 374831.6 22051801 4912.87 100.771 
Observations 256 255 259 200 252 235 262 177 
The table reports the descriptive statistics of Oil, Borrowing, corruption, Consumer price index, Durable is Political stability, 
Investment as Linv which the L denotes the natural log, natural log of GDP and unemployment as UN respectively.   
Tests for Stationarity: 
The data for the analysis need to be stationary for the correct interpretation of findings. The data 
should be stationary as non-stationary data generally causes mis-interpretation of results. Time 
series data in general is typically non-stationary in the observations and needs to be stationary 
for the right interpretation of results (Enders, 2008).  The unit root test checks the stationarity of 
the data and, while there are many tests for the unit root investigation, this paper analyses panel 
data using IM, Pesaran and Shin test, Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test and Phillips and Perron 
PP test (Hoang & McNown, 2006).  The IM, Pesaran and Shin test is a standard method when 
testing for stationarity within panel data. This paper, testing for unit roots, used IM, Pesaran and 
Shin for the test type, individual root, using individual intercept, Lag length of Automatic selection 
Schwarz Info Criterion with * for maximum lag. 
The result of the unit root tests for the macroeconomic variables for oil exporting countries in 
SSA are presented in table 3 below. The test shows that all the Borrowing, corruption, investment, 
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GDP, oil price, political stability (Durable) and unemployment are all non-stationary except the 
consumer price index (CPI), which is stationary in the observations. Since all the variables from 
the results are non-stationary at level except CPI and unemployment, the next step is to test for 
stationary by taking the first differences as shown in table 4. Investment and GDP use the natural 
logs since the values were large before testing for the stationarity of the variables.  
 
Table 3: IM, Pesaran and Shin test- Level 
      
SSA  Oil exporting countries 
IM, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  
 H0: variable has unit root 
 Variables Intercept  
  t-stat Prob* 
BORROWING 0.237 0.594 
CORRUPTION -1.060 0.145 
CPI -8.656 0.000 
LINV 3.146 0.999 
LGDP 5.518 1 
OILPRICE 6.787 1 
DURABLE -0.765 0.222 
UN -2.645 0.004 
** Probabilities are computed assuming asymptotic normality 
 
 
 
Table 4:  IM, Pesaran and Shin Test- 1st difference 
      
SSA  Oil exporting countries 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  
H0: variable has unit root 
Variables Intercept  
  t-stat Prob* 
BORROWING -13.209 0.000 
CORRUPTION -8.359 0.000 
CPI -8.656 0.000 
LINV -14.079 0.000 
LGDP -10.401 0 
OILPRICE -11.809 0 
DURABLE -11.134 0.000 
UN -5.989 0.000 
* Probabilities are computed assuming asymptotic normality 
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Structural VAR Results-Impulse response function and Variance Decomposition 
The main reason for the SVAR Framework is to examine any dynamic adjustments of each of the 
involved variables to exogenous structural shocks (Archanskaïa, Creel, & Hubert, 2012; Kilian & 
Park, 2009; Papapetrou, 2001). Impulse response functions show the effects of shocks on the 
adjustment path of the variables. How much each type of shock is contributing to the forecast 
error variance is measured by the forecast error variance decompositions. Both computations 
are helpful in determining how shocks to economic variables effect a system. Impulse Response 
Function of macroeconomic variables (DLINV, DLGDP, DUN, DDURABLE, DCORRUPTION, 
DBORROWING, and DCPI) shows rate change of one standard deviation in each of Oil prices 
shocks.  “An impulse response function (IRF) traces the effects of a one-time shock to one of the 
innovations on current and future values of the endogenous variables. If the innovations εt is 
contemporaneously uncorrelated. The innovation ε i is simply a shock to the i the endogenous 
variable yi, t. contain the impulse response functions for the responses of the macroeconomic 
variables to different oil price shocks” (Gottschalk, 2001). 
Some of the macroeconomic variables shows negative response to oil price shocks whilst others 
show positive response to oil price changes.  For the Investment variables we can infer that it has 
both positive and negative effects.  Investment had positive per cent change in the first lag with 
0.03, second lag with 0.03 and third lag with 0.04 and -0.03 for the fourth lag and begins to fade 
away from the fifth to the tenth lag. In GDP have both positive and negative effects.  GDP has 
positive percent change of 0.10 and 0.001 in the first and second lag respectively, and negative 
0.03 in the third lag and positive 0.04 in the fourth lag and begins to fade away in the fifth lag to 
the tenth lag. The result of IRF showed that the oil price effect on unemployment has a positive 
impact on the first and second lag. The third lag shows negative effects and fourth lag shows 
positive effects, then fades away from the sixth lag to tenth lag. The variable which represents 
political stability has both positive and negative effects. We see the negative effects in the first 
lag, with -0.020 percent change and the second, third and fourth lags with positive 0.40, 0.30 and 
0.40 respectively.  The effects fade away from the sixth lag to tenth. 
The corruption variables also have both positive and negative effects, the first and second lags 
have positive effects of 0.05 and 0.03 respectively, and whiles third lag has -0.02 negative effects 
and fourth lag positive effect of 0.05 and fades away from Fifth to tenth lags. 
Although the response of borrowing is statistically insignificant, the effect has a longer duration 
which would be expected, in the first lag borrowing is -0.02 and in the next lags fades away. The 
CPI variable is statistically insignificant but shows positive and negative effects, but the impact is 
indirect after three years, and the effect lasts for four years and then begins to fade away.  
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Table 5: Oil exporting countries in SSA Panel impulse response functions results  
 Response of DOILPRICE              
Period/Prob DOILPRICE DLINV DLGDP DCORRUPTION DBORROWING DDURABLE DCPI DUN 
1 13.431 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 
Prob -0.863 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 
2 -4.590 0.097 0.760 -1.462 -0.705 -0.551 0.194 -1.080 
Prob -1.283 -1.352 -1.234 -1.310 -1.154 -1.277 -0.382 -1.223 
3 -3.618 0.833 -0.217 0.251 -0.888 0.665 -0.619 -0.215 
Prob -1.470 -1.528 -1.202 -1.280 -1.403 -1.138 -0.792 -1.231 
4 3.096 -0.425 0.089 0.081 0.444 0.541 -0.199 0.533 
Prob -1.252 -1.186 -0.747 -0.826 -0.680 -0.694 -0.420 -0.828 
5 0.759 -0.136 0.089 -0.137 -0.026 -0.124 0.036 -0.289 
Prob -0.945 -0.667 -0.532 -0.694 -0.461 -0.566 -0.344 -0.376 
6 -1.464 0.211 0.013 0.125 -0.128 -0.084 -0.084 -0.153 
Prob -0.975 -0.496 -0.262 -0.343 -0.316 -0.361 -0.274 -0.332 
7 0.189 0.077 -0.011 0.198 -0.020 0.099 -0.105 0.111 
Prob -0.543 -0.279 -0.194 -0.304 -0.196 -0.223 -0.221 -0.171 
8 0.570 -0.107 0.053 -0.036 0.076 -0.028 -0.029 0.034 
Prob -0.560 -0.203 -0.141 -0.161 -0.168 -0.159 -0.123 -0.140 
9 -0.235 0.037 0.015 -0.040 -0.041 -0.053 -0.022 -0.069 
Prob -0.345 -0.144 -0.076 -0.126 -0.082 -0.106 -0.113 -0.094 
10 -0.172 0.041 0.004 0.018 -0.021 0.022 -0.043 0.010 
Prob -0.267 -0.088 -0.057 -0.086 -0.063 -0.071 -0.099 -0.053 
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Table 6: Oil exporting countries in SSA Panel impulse response functions results 
Response of DLINV              
Period DOILPRICE DLINV DLGDP DCORRUPTION DDURABLE DBORROWING DCPI DUN 
1 0.027 0.299 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Prob -0.027 -0.019 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2 0.035 -0.054 0.053 -0.014 0.039 0.0293 0.005 -0.001 
Prob -0.029 -0.031 -0.028 -0.029 -0.029 -0.026 -0.009 -0.027 
3 0.041 0.018 -0.023 0.004 0.031 -0.024 -0.015 -0.008 
Prob -0.032 -0.033 -0.026 -0.028 -0.025 -0.030 -0.017 -0.027 
4 -0.026 0.003 0.012 -0.007 -0.007 0.018 0.001 -0.004 
Prob -0.022 -0.024 -0.015 -0.017 -0.013 -0.016 -0.010 -0.016 
5 0.004 0.004 -0.003 0.020 0.006 -0.009 -0.003 -0.002 
Prob -0.013 -0.013 -0.011 -0.011 -0.010 -0.013 -0.010 -0.009 
6 0.009 0.000 0.003 0.003 -0.002 0.005 -0.003 0.003 
Prob -0.012 -0.009 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.008 -0.007 -0.006 
7 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
Prob -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.006 -0.004 
8 -0.004 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.001 
Prob -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.005 -0.002 
9 0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
Prob -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 
10 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
Prob -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 
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Table 7: Oil exporting countries in SSA Panel impulse response functions results 
 Response of DLGDP            
Period DOILPRICE DLINV DLGDP DUN DDURABLE DCORRUPTION DBORROWING DCPI 
1 0.103 0.065 0.155 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Prob -0.017 -0.015 -0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2 -0.032 0.066 -0.002 -0.014 0.019 -0.0020 0.002 -0.012 
Prob -0.019 -0.020 -0.018 -0.018 -0.019 -0.019 -0.017 -0.006 
3 0.007 0.032 0.002 -0.002 0.027 -0.010 0.024 0.019 
Prob -0.022 -0.022 -0.018 -0.018 -0.017 -0.020 -0.020 -0.011 
4 0.034 -0.004 -0.003 0.002 0.011 0.001 0.006 0.012 
Prob -0.014 -0.016 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.014 -0.011 -0.008 
5 -0.004 0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 0.005 0.004 0.008 
Prob -0.010 -0.009 -0.007 -0.006 -0.008 -0.010 -0.009 -0.008 
6 -0.010 0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 0.007 0.001 0.007 
Prob -0.009 -0.006 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.007 
7 0.005 -0.001 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.003 0.002 0.005 
Prob -0.006 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.006 
8 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.005 
Prob -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 
9 -0.004 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.003 
Prob -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 
10 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.003 
Prob -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 
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Table 8: Oil exporting countries in SSA Panel impulse response functions results 
 Response of DUN                
Period DOILPRICE DLINV DLGDP DUN DDURABLE DCORRUPTION DBORROWING DCPI 
1 -0.024 0.001 0.014 0.581 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Prob -0.053 -0.053 -0.053 -0.037 0.000 0.0000 0.000 0.000 
2 0.083 0.005 0.066 -0.195 0.015 0.022 0.032 -0.033 
Prob -0.057 -0.061 -0.056 -0.054 -0.055 -0.057 -0.050 -0.017 
3 -0.018 -0.083 -0.067 0.056 0.012 -0.002 0.043 0.021 
Prob -0.064 -0.067 -0.053 -0.054 -0.050 -0.056 -0.061 -0.034 
4 -0.028 0.064 0.001 -0.016 -0.024 0.005 -0.013 0.014 
Prob -0.047 -0.050 -0.032 -0.037 -0.027 -0.029 -0.035 -0.018 
5 -0.003 -0.036 0.009 0.014 -0.007 0.010 0.014 0.001 
Prob -0.026 -0.028 -0.023 -0.021 -0.018 -0.021 -0.027 -0.018 
6 0.018 0.013 -0.010 -0.003 0.002 0.003 -0.010 0.001 
Prob -0.023 -0.018 -0.014 -0.012 -0.010 -0.011 -0.017 -0.010 
7 -0.013 -0.007 0.005 0.001 -0.006 -0.011 0.008 0.003 
Prob -0.014 -0.011 -0.009 -0.008 -0.007 -0.009 -0.012 -0.009 
8 -0.001 0.003 -0.003 -0.001 0.003 0.002 -0.005 0.001 
Prob -0.010 -0.007 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.008 -0.007 
9 0.003 -0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.001 
Prob -0.007 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.006 
10 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001 
Prob -0.004 -0.0031 -0.0023 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 
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Table 9: Oil exporting countries in SSA Panel impulse response functions results 
 Response of DDURABLE:            
Period DOILPRICE DLINV DLGDP DUN DDURABLE DCORRUPTION DBORROWING DCPI 
1 0.702 0.386 0.341 -0.126 3.906 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 -0.361 -0.358 -0.356 -0.355 -0.251 0.0000 0.000 0.000 
2 0.289 0.100 -0.235 -0.186 -0.020 -1.151 0.290 -0.128 
 -0.385 -0.414 -0.380 -0.377 -0.393 -0.397 -0.344 -0.114 
3 0.353 0.004 0.151 -0.099 0.021 0.832 0.417 0.266 
 -0.427 -0.444 -0.348 -0.356 -0.341 -0.386 -0.395 -0.220 
4 -0.152 0.300 -0.164 -0.012 0.099 0.682 -0.191 0.073 
 -0.277 -0.312 -0.199 -0.199 -0.190 -0.267 -0.202 -0.165 
5 0.017 -0.053 0.081 0.032 -0.256 0.057 0.178 0.051 
 -0.231 -0.194 -0.153 -0.142 -0.158 -0.168 -0.171 -0.142 
6 0.109 0.009 -0.026 0.008 -0.106 0.039 -0.013 0.070 
 -0.167 -0.121 -0.088 -0.068 -0.104 -0.132 -0.093 -0.117 
7 -0.132 0.022 0.001 0.018 -0.030 -0.083 0.014 0.041 
 -0.111 -0.075 -0.056 -0.046 -0.065 -0.085 -0.063 -0.080 
8 -0.026 -0.004 -0.013 0.004 0.015 -0.060 -0.007 0.025 
 -0.072 -0.041 -0.037 -0.026 -0.044 -0.061 -0.037 -0.067 
9 0.046 -0.021 -0.011 0.011 0.023 -0.029 0.013 0.023 
 -0.052 -0.029 -0.027 -0.020 -0.031 -0.036 -0.023 -0.048 
10 -0.008 -0.002 -0.010 -0.007 0.007 -0.006 -0.001 0.021 
  -0.033 -0.017 -0.018 -0.011 -0.020 -0.027 -0.015 -0.039 
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Table 10: Oil exporting countries in SSA Panel impulse response functions results 
 Response of DCORRUPTION 
Period DOILPRICE DLINV DLGDP DUN DDURABLE DCORRUPTION DBORROWING DCPI 
1 0.052 0.036 0.026 0.006 0.019 0.285 0.000 0.000 
Prob -0.027 -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 -0.0184 0.000 0.000 
2 0.028 0.024 -0.006 -0.013 -0.027 0.122 -0.002 -0.003 
Prob -0.029 -0.032 -0.029 -0.029 -0.030 -0.030 -0.025 -0.008 
3 -0.002 -0.002 0.010 0.003 -0.063 0.008 0.021 0.009 
Prob -0.032 -0.033 -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 -0.030 -0.028 -0.015 
4 -0.018 0.011 0.002 0.004 -0.020 -0.008 -0.005 0.005 
Prob -0.016 -0.021 -0.013 -0.009 -0.014 -0.025 -0.015 -0.016 
5 -0.010 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.002 -0.022 0.000 0.000 
Prob -0.016 -0.013 -0.008 -0.007 -0.011 -0.014 -0.011 -0.013 
6 0.007 -0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.007 -0.016 0.000 0.001 
Prob -0.008 -0.007 -0.005 -0.004 -0.008 -0.010 -0.005 -0.011 
7 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.005 -0.005 0.000 0.001 
Prob -0.006 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.007 -0.003 -0.008 
8 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.002 -0.001 0.001 
Prob -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.006 -0.002 -0.006 
9 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.001 
Prob -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 
10 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001 
Prob -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 
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Table 10: Oil exporting countries in SSA Panel impulse response functions results 
 Response of DCORRUPTION 
Period DOILPRICE DLINV DLGDP DUN DDURABLE DCORRUPTION DBORROWING DCPI 
1 -1.504 0.288 -7.354 -0.444 -0.464 -2.670 25.517 0.000 
Prob -2.429 -2.427 -2.380 -2.333 -2.333 -2.3260 -1.640 0.000 
2 0.068 5.622 -3.385 1.800 -1.502 1.748 -1.879 4.490 
Prob -2.579 -2.753 -2.491 -2.464 -2.570 -2.638 -2.334 -0.813 
3 -1.691 -3.645 2.775 2.053 -2.221 0.937 2.551 -1.976 
Prob -2.861 -2.966 -2.304 -2.354 -2.234 -2.555 -2.656 -1.485 
4 0.910 1.326 -0.902 -0.598 -0.224 1.032 -1.630 -1.292 
Prob -1.813 -2.061 -1.291 -1.323 -1.196 -1.696 -1.395 -1.063 
5 -0.681 -0.596 0.838 0.508 -0.580 -1.182 0.987 -0.786 
Prob -1.291 -1.198 -0.959 -0.906 -0.922 -0.969 -1.197 -0.963 
6 0.098 0.394 0.021 -0.252 0.258 -0.114 -0.783 -0.806 
Prob -0.862 -0.763 -0.600 -0.548 -0.496 -0.620 -0.732 -0.662 
7 0.016 -0.161 0.335 0.150 0.220 -0.293 0.172 -0.695 
Prob -0.541 -0.493 -0.425 -0.375 -0.318 -0.423 -0.553 -0.565 
8 0.221 0.166 0.104 -0.163 0.190 0.059 -0.265 -0.532 
Prob -0.433 -0.333 -0.281 -0.226 -0.222 -0.319 -0.355 -0.405 
9 0.014 -0.021 0.187 0.005 0.071 0.064 0.018 -0.437 
Prob -0.245 -0.217 -0.197 -0.153 -0.148 -0.207 -0.250 -0.348 
10 0.071 0.115 0.099 -0.065 0.049 0.126 -0.121 -0.352 
Prob -0.176 -0.156 -0.142 -0.108 -0.105 -0.131 -0.171 -0.265 
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Table 11: Oil exporting countries in SSA Panel impulse response functions results 
Response of DBORROWING 
Period DOILPRICE DLINV DLGDP DUN DDURABLE DCORRUPTION DBORROWING DCPI 
1 -1.504 0.288 -7.354 -0.444 -0.464 -2.670 25.517 0.000 
 -2.429 -2.427 -2.380 -2.333 -2.333 -2.3260 -1.640 0.000 
2 0.068 5.622 -3.385 1.800 -1.502 1.748 -1.879 4.490 
 -2.579 -2.753 -2.491 -2.464 -2.570 -2.638 -2.334 -0.813 
3 -1.691 -3.645 2.775 2.053 -2.221 0.937 2.551 -1.976 
 -2.861 -2.966 -2.304 -2.354 -2.234 -2.555 -2.656 -1.485 
4 0.910 1.326 -0.902 -0.598 -0.224 1.032 -1.630 -1.292 
 -1.813 -2.061 -1.291 -1.323 -1.196 -1.696 -1.395 -1.063 
5 -0.681 -0.596 0.838 0.508 -0.580 -1.182 0.987 -0.786 
 -1.291 -1.198 -0.959 -0.906 -0.922 -0.969 -1.197 -0.963 
6 0.098 0.394 0.021 -0.252 0.258 -0.114 -0.783 -0.806 
 -0.862 -0.763 -0.600 -0.548 -0.496 -0.620 -0.732 -0.662 
7 0.016 -0.161 0.335 0.150 0.220 -0.293 0.172 -0.695 
 -0.541 -0.493 -0.425 -0.375 -0.318 -0.423 -0.553 -0.565 
8 0.221 0.166 0.104 -0.163 0.190 0.059 -0.265 -0.532 
 -0.433 -0.333 -0.281 -0.226 -0.222 -0.319 -0.355 -0.405 
9 0.014 -0.021 0.187 0.005 0.071 0.064 0.018 -0.437 
 -0.245 -0.217 -0.197 -0.153 -0.148 -0.207 -0.250 -0.348 
10 0.071 0.115 0.099 -0.065 0.049 0.126 -0.121 -0.352 
  -0.176 -0.156 -0.142 -0.108 -0.105 -0.131 -0.171 -0.265 
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Table 12: Oil exporting countries in SSA Panel impulse response functions results 
Response of DCPI 
Period DOILPRICE DLINV DLGDP DUN DDURABLE DCORRUPTION DBORROWING DCPI 
1 0.824 -3.855 -1.767 0.089 0.961 0.478 -3.455 22.172 
Prob -2.079 -2.064 -2.045 -2.042 -2.041 -2.0402 -2.028 -1.425 
2 -0.958 -1.823 -5.556 -0.017 0.536 0.574 3.396 14.217 
Prob -2.543 -2.689 -2.492 -2.455 -2.536 -2.590 -2.361 -1.121 
3 -1.950 0.009 -5.166 0.218 -1.769 -0.926 2.589 14.437 
Prob -3.013 -3.089 -2.596 -2.608 -2.673 -2.949 -2.721 -1.483 
4 -1.273 -2.048 -3.584 1.095 -1.527 -0.274 2.405 11.373 
Prob -1.927 -2.549 -2.078 -1.922 -2.241 -2.877 -2.288 -1.562 
5 -1.127 -1.029 -3.425 0.637 -1.204 -0.531 1.346 9.110 
Prob -1.636 -2.291 -1.878 -1.720 -1.993 -2.503 -2.235 -1.819 
6 -1.395 -1.273 -2.545 0.627 -1.164 -0.954 1.515 7.465 
Prob -1.468 -1.893 -1.490 -1.335 -1.596 -2.041 -1.770 -1.964 
7 -0.889 -0.919 -2.236 0.480 -0.739 -0.657 0.949 6.040 
Prob -1.123 -1.578 -1.284 -1.127 -1.248 -1.534 -1.553 -1.994 
8 -0.745 -0.841 -1.750 0.430 -0.599 -0.637 0.901 4.898 
Prob -0.881 -1.293 -1.080 -0.915 -0.979 -1.173 -1.251 -1.964 
9 -0.617 -0.655 -1.455 0.296 -0.477 -0.458 0.658 3.978 
Prob -0.734 -1.050 -0.925 -0.741 -0.770 -0.907 -1.051 -1.872 
10 -0.512 -0.549 -1.171 0.267 -0.391 -0.350 0.569 3.227 
Prob -0.613 -0.862 -0.798 -0.605 -0.630 -0.741 -0.859 -1.748 
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Oil exporting countries in SSA Panel impulse response functions results graph 
Figure 3: Response to Structure One S.D. Innovations  
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Table 13: Variance Decomposition of OILPRICE 
Variance Decomposition Table Results 
                    
Period S.E. DOILPRICE DLINV DLGDP DUN DDURABLE DCORRUPTION DBORROWING CPI 
1 13.322 100.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2 16.457 96.586 2.452 0.040 0.452 0.000 0.073 0.050 0.347 
3 19.610 94.710 3.536 0.034 0.936 0.301 0.105 0.120 0.258 
4 22.450 92.803 4.037 0.083 1.731 0.707 0.154 0.251 0.233 
5 25.256 90.831 4.165 0.229 2.674 1.216 0.204 0.473 0.208 
6 28.122 88.665 4.211 0.512 3.735 1.681 0.238 0.761 0.196 
7 31.138 86.170 4.326 0.962 4.882 2.099 0.254 1.116 0.192 
8 34.369 83.334 4.575 1.597 6.086 2.458 0.249 1.507 0.193 
9 37.877 80.187 4.966 2.416 7.314 2.778 0.231 1.911 0.198 
10 41.707 76.831 5.465 3.400 8.525 3.069 0.205 2.302 0.203 
 
 
 
Table 14: Variance Decomposition ofDLINV 
                    
Period S.E. DOILPRICE DLINV DLGDP DUN DDURABLE DCORRUPTION DBORROWING CPI 
1 0.259 1.454 98.546 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2 0.413 1.824 96.647 0.001 0.771 0.001 0.287 0.043 0.425 
3 0.500 2.086 94.594 0.042 1.798 0.129 0.395 0.184 0.772 
4 0.542 2.339 92.002 0.267 3.029 0.397 0.395 0.450 1.122 
5 0.564 2.453 88.991 0.820 4.343 0.731 0.370 0.882 1.410 
6 0.579 2.442 85.771 1.794 5.600 1.009 0.352 1.422 1.609 
7 0.593 2.356 82.457 3.196 6.726 1.207 0.339 1.992 1.728 
8 0.607 2.248 79.134 4.954 7.706 1.337 0.325 2.508 1.788 
9 0.622 2.152 75.884 6.943 8.544 1.434 0.309 2.922 1.811 
10 0.638 2.086 72.809 9.012 9.248 1.525 0.296 3.212 1.813 
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Table 15: Variance Decomposition of DLGDP 
                    
Period S.E. DOILPRICE DLINV DLGDP DUN DDURABLE DCORRUPTION DBORROWING CPI 
1 82.406 0.004 0.152 99.844 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2 120.355 0.076 0.260 80.241 7.227 4.383 0.144 7.588 0.080 
3 142.942 0.229 0.698 80.594 8.766 3.671 0.107 5.879 0.057 
4 160.790 0.627 1.551 78.913 9.053 4.480 0.093 5.217 0.065 
5 173.736 0.991 2.884 77.941 8.956 4.545 0.112 4.512 0.059 
6 183.523 1.469 4.102 76.523 8.710 4.956 0.129 4.053 0.057 
7 190.399 2.000 5.014 75.297 8.439 5.270 0.144 3.782 0.054 
8 195.105 2.647 5.520 74.136 8.183 5.664 0.148 3.650 0.052 
9 198.221 3.398 5.724 73.079 7.968 5.996 0.147 3.637 0.051 
10 200.386 4.264 5.743 72.035 7.799 6.278 0.144 3.688 0.050 
 
 
Table 16: Variance Decomposition of DUNE 
                    
Period S.E. DOILPRICE DLINV DLGDP DUNE DDURABLE DCORRUPTION DBORROWING CPI 
1 0.207 23.069 0.029 0.745 76.158 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2 0.294 15.004 0.298 0.413 80.214 3.841 0.043 0.170 0.019 
3 0.366 12.182 0.919 0.266 79.958 6.197 0.159 0.308 0.012 
4 0.431 10.136 2.043 0.193 79.167 7.882 0.299 0.260 0.020 
5 0.493 8.661 3.394 0.164 78.159 8.917 0.476 0.201 0.028 
6 0.553 7.541 4.708 0.189 77.019 9.656 0.668 0.178 0.042 
7 0.612 6.678 5.859 0.308 75.860 10.147 0.865 0.223 0.061 
8 0.672 6.016 6.810 0.567 74.628 10.481 1.056 0.356 0.087 
9 0.733 5.512 7.590 1.015 73.271 10.683 1.238 0.570 0.121 
10 0.796 5.143 8.239 1.684 71.727 10.785 1.408 0.854 0.160 
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Table 17: Variance Decomposition of DDURABLE 
                    
Period S.E. DOILPRICE DLINV DLGDP DUN DDURABLE DCORRUPTION DBORROWING CPI 
1 0.284 0.395 0.139 0.005 19.656 79.806 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2 0.370 1.762 0.109 0.250 24.218 69.928 1.033 2.441 0.261 
3 0.440 3.637 0.474 1.252 26.342 64.376 1.888 1.832 0.201 
4 0.492 5.264 1.444 2.064 28.914 57.784 2.864 1.489 0.179 
5 0.542 6.893 2.499 2.340 31.245 51.904 3.571 1.401 0.148 
6 0.592 8.372 3.514 2.112 33.769 46.366 4.089 1.653 0.124 
7 0.646 9.744 4.370 1.782 36.075 41.208 4.355 2.355 0.110 
8 0.707 10.948 5.148 1.825 37.973 36.288 4.427 3.286 0.106 
9 0.777 11.960 5.891 2.545 39.173 31.677 4.329 4.313 0.113 
10 0.859 12.773 6.642 4.005 39.619 27.480 4.118 5.234 0.129 
 
 
 
 
Table 18: Variance Decomposition of Corruption 
                    
Period S.E. DOILPRICE DLINV DLGDP DUN DDURABLE DCORRUPTION DBORROWING CPI 
1 3.929 0.801 1.063 0.000 1.238 1.867 95.032 0.000 0.000 
2 5.338 0.804 0.588 0.017 1.044 4.079 93.469 0.001 0.000 
3 6.283 0.647 0.433 0.059 1.085 6.166 91.587 0.006 0.017 
4 6.995 0.612 0.739 0.097 1.128 8.169 89.167 0.057 0.032 
5 7.561 0.673 1.597 0.116 1.151 9.634 86.608 0.184 0.037 
6 8.027 0.866 2.630 0.111 1.169 10.598 84.163 0.429 0.034 
7 8.416 1.215 3.428 0.103 1.204 11.167 82.046 0.806 0.031 
8 8.751 1.750 3.828 0.144 1.276 11.490 80.158 1.324 0.031 
9 9.057 2.493 3.878 0.319 1.405 11.651 78.249 1.973 0.033 
10 9.358 3.462 3.715 0.729 1.607 11.696 76.025 2.728 0.039 
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Table 19: Variance Decomposition of DBORROWING 
                    
Period S.E. DOILPRICE DLINV DLGDP DUN DDURABLE DCORRUPTION DBORROWING CPI 
1 32.270 0.727 0.212 0.148 23.656 2.830 0.208 72.219 0.000 
2 46.953 0.778 1.247 9.305 25.414 5.393 0.369 57.474 0.021 
3 63.632 1.048 3.092 19.940 24.911 3.039 0.346 47.551 0.074 
4 81.097 1.264 5.586 29.246 24.039 1.872 0.391 37.525 0.076 
5 99.341 1.580 7.810 35.577 22.870 1.446 0.425 30.213 0.080 
6 117.223 1.951 9.633 39.946 21.789 1.416 0.462 24.727 0.076 
7 134.266 2.432 10.937 42.799 20.825 1.686 0.486 20.764 0.073 
8 149.987 3.028 11.825 44.676 20.001 2.074 0.502 17.823 0.071 
9 164.230 3.768 12.382 45.823 19.287 2.542 0.508 15.620 0.071 
10 176.948 4.667 12.704 46.427 18.661 3.029 0.509 13.931 0.072 
 
 
Table 20: Variance Decomposition of DCPI 
                    
Period S.E. DOILPRICE DLINV DLGDP DUN DDURABLE DCORRUPTION DBORROWING CPI 
1 0.603 0.108 0.296 0.220 0.204 0.109 0.073 0.123 98.869 
2 0.758 0.500 0.188 0.160 0.244 0.130 0.096 0.127 98.557 
3 0.899 0.357 0.357 0.177 0.224 0.239 0.235 0.092 98.319 
4 1.022 0.282 0.732 0.198 0.189 0.233 0.352 0.098 97.916 
5 1.132 0.231 1.288 0.245 0.161 0.233 0.491 0.092 97.261 
6 1.235 0.203 1.879 0.293 0.137 0.214 0.636 0.091 96.547 
7 1.331 0.196 2.410 0.341 0.119 0.195 0.796 0.086 95.857 
8 1.421 0.205 2.849 0.380 0.104 0.175 0.969 0.081 95.236 
9 1.506 0.229 3.197 0.410 0.093 0.156 1.155 0.075 94.685 
10 1.586 0.264 3.475 0.429 0.084 0.141 1.347 0.070 94.189 
Source: Output software Eviews 
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Figure 4: Variance Decomposition (Combined Graph) 
 
 
Variance Decomposition Results 
“Variance decomposition (VD) describes the percentage of the forecast error variance of a 
variable that is attributable to its own innovations and other variables” (Bouchaour, Cherifa and 
Hussein Ali Al-Zeaud 2012). The above tables and graphs show that the macroeconomic variables 
respond to oil price shocks consistent with prior studies. The result of VD above indicate that the 
largest source of shocks was changes in the oil price (OP) itself; which contributed about 100% in 
1st year declining to 77% in tenth year. 
Variance Decomposition of DLINV:  the largest source of shocks was changes in DLINV itself, 
contributing 99% in the first year and declining in the tenth year to 73% see the table above. 
For DLGDP; the largest source of shocks was changes in RGDP itself; which contributed about 
99.84 per cent in the first year; diminishing to about 72% percent in the last year. The 
contribution of oil prices shocks significantly affects GDP in oil exporting SSA countries in the 
long-run more than the short-run.  The contributions of oil prices in GDP are very high and that 
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emphasizes the fact that oil price shocks are necessary, sufficient to explain changes that 
occurred in GDP for oil exporting countries in SSA  (Farzanegan & Markwardt, 2009). 
Unemployment 76.1% rate in the first year; declining to 73.2% per cent in the tenth year, 
however oil price changes in unemployment in first year to the tenth year, the marginal of 
decrease was less than 2.31%. The findings shows that oil price shocks do impact unemployment 
(Doğrul & Soytas, 2010).   
Durable, which is political stability, in the first year is 80% decreasing to 27% in the tenth year.  
As mentioned earlier, African oil exporting countries are among the most corrupt countries in the 
world, suffering from political instability, violence and civil war. Ian Gary (2003) states that: 
“Fights over oil revenues become the reason for intensifying up the level of pre-existing conflict 
in a society, and oil may even become the very rationale for starting wars. Petroleum revenues 
are also a central mechanism for prolonging violent conflict and only rarely a catalyst for 
resolution.  Example, of Sudan, the Republic of Congo, and Nigeria” (African Development Bank, 
2009). 
Corruption is the use of official position for selfish enrichment to the detriment of the citizens or 
the people they serve. In Africa, especially oil exporting countries in the SSA region, corruption is 
omnipresent. Corruption deceives in its ability to influence the very roots of an economy, and 
has significant impact for both efficiency and equity. It strains political institutions and thus also 
threatens democracy and the social, political, and economic benefits attributed to it. It is often 
undertaken in secret and consequently complicates the nature of economic exchange (Edgardo 
Campos, Lien, & Pradhan, 1999; Fisman & Gatti, 2002; Mauro, 1998). 96% of variation in oil price 
is explained by corruption in the first year, decreasing to 76% of variation explained in the tenth 
year.  Corruption impedes growth, investment and breeds poverty in SSA. 
Borrowing shows that 76% of variations where related to changes in oil price shocks and 
decreasing to 14% in the tenth year, whiles as CPI had 99% variation explained by oil price 
changes declining to 94% in the tenth year. This confirms that CPI is significant with oil price 
shocks in SSA Oil exporting countries. 
Correlation Test: 
The next section of the analysis investigates whether there is association between the oil price, 
borrowing and corruption of the oil exporting countries in SSA.  According to (Kao, 1999), to 
establish whether a relationship or association exists among three variables (i.e. if there is 
correlation or not), the first rule is that if the relationship or association is not known then we 
use two tailed test, but if we know one association then one tailed test could be used. In this 
study the relationship or association between oil price and borrowing for the oil exporting 
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countries in SSA is examined. Since we do not know the relationship and from literature if the 
relationships are not known, then two tailed test must be used to test for the relationship or 
association. In this study, the SPSS Pearson Correlation model is used to test for the relationship 
between Oil price, borrowing and corruption using two tailed test. 
Null Hypothesis: There is no relationship or association between Oil prices, Corruption and 
borrowing 
Alternative Hypothesis:  There is a positive relationship or association between oil prices, 
corruption and borrowing 
If the Sig/P value is less than 5 per cent we reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative 
hypothesis, if the sig/p value is more than 5 per cent we do not reject null hypothesis. So from 
the results below the Sig/P value for borrowing is 0.000 and corruption is 0.002 which are each 
less than 5 per cent. Therefore we reject null hypothesis, meaning there is a relationship or 
association among oil prices, borrowing and corruption.   
The relationship between corruption and borrowing was tested to see if there is correlation 
among them or not  
Null Hypothesis: There is no relationship or association between Corruption and borrowing 
Alternative Hypothesis:  There is relationship or association between corruption and 
borrowing and the results below: 
Table 21: Correlations (Oil Price, Borrowing and Corruption) 
  Oil Price Borrowing Corruption 
Oil Price 
Pearson Correlation 1 -.418** -.212** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  0 0.002 
N 264 254 201 
Borrowing 
Pearson Correlation -.418** 1 .511** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0  0 
N 254 261 199 
Corruption 
Pearson Correlation -.212** .511** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.002 0  
N 201 199 207 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 21 shows the correlations between the Oil Price, Borrowings, and Corruption. The 
correlations between the Oil Price, and Borrowing and Corruption are significant at the 99 per 
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cent level for the two tailed test.  The Sig/P value for borrowing and corruption are 0.000 and 
0.000 respectively, therefore we reject the null hypothesis because there is enough statistical 
evidence to conclude that there is a correlation or relationship among the three variables. The 
correlation test above are for the missing data and for robustness check I will use the forecasted 
data (FD) to test for correlation among Oil price, borrowing and corruption and see if I may get 
different results or otherwise. 
Correlation Test for Forecasted Data for Robustness check 
Null Hypothesis: There is no relationship or association between Oil prices, Corruption and 
borrowing 
Alternative Hypothesis:  There is relationship or association between oil prices, corruption 
and borrowing 
The results in Table 22 the Sig/P value for borrowing is .000 and corruption is .002 which is all 
less than 5 percent. Therefore we reject null hypothesis, meaning there is relationship or 
association among oil prices, borrowing and corruption.  The correlation is significant at 99 
percent level for the two tailed test. 
Table 22: Correlations (Oil Price Corruption and Borrowing) FD 
  Oil Price Corruption Borrowing 
Oil Price 
Pearson Correlation 1 -.183** -.397** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  0.002 0.000 
N 280 280 280 
Corruption 
Pearson Correlation -.183** 1 .459** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.002  0.000 
N 280 280 280 
Borrowing 
Pearson Correlation -.397** .459** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000  
N 280 280 280 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
The Sig/P value for borrowing and corruption are .000 and .000 respectively, therefore reject the 
null and therefore concluded that there is correlation or relationship among the three variables.  
The correlation is significant at 99 percent level for the two tailed test. Both missing data and 
forecasted data values are given the same results though we forecasted the missing data using 
multiple imputations by applying ARMA model. (Humphries, 2013)  
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Robustness Check 
For robustness check a test for the unit root for missing data and forecasted data was performed 
and the results were similar, also the descriptive statistics results for the missing data and 
forecasted data was the same. The forecasted came about since countries in Angola and South 
Sudan have been in war and as results there were no data for most of the macroeconomic 
variables, so I employed the advanced technique of ARMA model to fill in the missing data.  I 
tested also for the impulse response function and variance decomposition for the forecasted data 
as well as correlation test. The results are almost similar (see Appendix for the forecasted results). 
This proved that the robustness of the results was checked in the study.   
Comparative Analysis 
Mork (1989) empirically estimated macroeconomic impacts and found the “oil price effects were 
stronger and more frequently statistically significant in the multivariate analyses than in the 
bivariate”. In Mork’s study “countries except Norway experienced negative relationships 
between oil price increases and GDP growth. The significance level was weakened somewhat for 
Germany in the multivariate case but was strengthened for Canada and France. In the 
multivariate estimation, the U.S., Canada (both at the 2% level), Japan (at 3%), and Germany (at 
10%) demonstrated significant evidence of asymmetry”. They “estimated regressions of GDP on 
only contemporaneous and lagged oil prices as well as multivariate regressions which included 
also the inflation rate (measured by the GDP deflator), short-term interest rates, the 
unemployment rate, and the growth rate of industrial production for the entire OECD as a proxy 
for exogenous export demand”. 
Jiménez-Rodríguez and Sanchez (2005) found that an increased in oil prices has a significant 
negative impact on the GDP growth in all oil importing countries except Japan. The GDP results 
in this study show that oil price shocks positively affects the GDP of oil exporting countries in SSA. 
The impact persist for one period using impulse response function and is significant. 
Umar and Kilishi, (2010) examined the “impact of crude oil price changes on four key 
macroeconomic variables over the period 1970 to 2008. A VAR analysis showed that oil prices 
have significant impact on real GDP, money supply and unemployment”. However, there appears 
to be an insignificant impact on consumer price index. This suggest that only three key 
macroeconomic variables in Nigeria are significantly explained by exogenous oil shocks. The 
results on employment and CPI are positively affected by oil price shocks. In this study, CPI was 
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contrary to the findings of the above, however, vulnerability to external shocks appears to exist 
for the SSA countries in this study.  Farzanegan and Markwardt (2009) investigate the dynamic 
relationship between oil price shocks and major macroeconomic variables in Iran over the period 
1975to 2006 by applying a VAR approach. Their results indicate there is a positive asymmetric 
effect of oil price shocks on industrial output.   
Fowowe and Iwayemi (2011) conducted an “empirical analysis of the effects of oil price shocks 
on a SSA oil-exporter Nigeria. The study found that oil price shocks do not have a major impact 
on most macroeconomic variables in Nigeria over the period 1985: Q1 to 2007: Q4. The results 
of the Granger-causality tests, impulse response functions; and variance decomposition analysis 
all showed that different measures of linear and positive oil shocks have not caused output; 
government expenditure; inflation; and the real exchange rate. The tests support the existence 
of asymmetric effects of oil price shocks due to the fact that negative oil price shocks significantly 
affect output and the real exchange rate”. 
6. Conclusions and Policy implications 
The objective of the study was to examine the impact of oil price shocks on macroeconomic 
variables of SSA oil exporting countries.  The study also investigates the relationship between oil 
price, corruption and borrowing pattern in these oil exporting countries. There are many 
empirical studies on the impact of oil price shocks on economies which are either exporting or 
importing countries. (Elder & Serletis, 2009; Kilian & Park, 2009; Omojolaibi, 2013; Peersman & 
Van Robays, 2012). Most of these countries are developed economies and few emerging 
economies but little studies on Africa. The Sub Saharan African oil exporting countries was chosen 
for this study due to oil being the major revenue for these countries but yet their citizenry are 
living in massive poverty. Secondly most developed oil exporting countries have used these oil 
revenues to increase investments, capital inflow, developed their infrastructural to improve the 
standard of living for its population while the oil exporting SSA countries have massive corruption, 
low standard of living, lack of investments and infrastructure development. A combination of 
models and variables of different studies was employed in the study including the SVAR Model, 
impulse response function and variance decomposition.  The results from the impulse response 
function showed that Investment, GDP, corruption and unemployment are affected by oil price 
shocks. Variance Decomposition exhibited the same results as impulse response function, 
portion of oil price shock and is present in the investment, GDP, corruption and unemployment 
for these oil exporting countries. 
The oil prices fluctuations have an indirect positive effect on GDP that are explained by the 
increase in oil prices causing a higher cash income; and this will affect all the components of GDP; 
so that encourage foreign investors to settle their investment in the country. Investment should 
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increase capital inflow to these oil exporting countries to promote growth and increase 
employment. 
Corruption need to be checked or controlled as it erodes investors’ confidence to invest in 
countries with low corruption index like Nigeria. Countries in oil exporting countries should invest 
in human capital, build infrastructural, and create independent institutions that will deal with 
corrupt public officials who steal oil revenues.  
Future research is required to be undertaken to study further the impact of oil price shocks on 
the borrowing pattern of oil exporting countries in SSA by employing other important 
macroeconomic variables such as exchange rate and monetary policy. Exchange rate is important 
because when the oil price increases, government revenue will increase, which will lead to 
national currency appreciation and lead to massive development in the SSA region.    
 
7. Contribution: 
This study contributes to the existing empirical literature by incorporating some new variables of 
Borrowing, corruption and Political stability due to the nature of problems relating to the SSA 
region. The new variables might not be an issue for previous studies focusing on developed 
countries however they are a major problem in SSA.  
The research contributes to the empirical literature on the impact of oil price shocks on 
macroeconomic variables of all oil exporting and selected importing countries in SSA, where 
there is no evidence of any such research done relating to SSA in this context. 
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Figure 5: Crude Oil Prices 1947 - October 2011 
 
Source: www.wtrg.com/graph/2010 
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Figure 6: Crude Oil Prices 1970 - October 2011 
  
 Source of the above Graph:  www.wtrg.com/graph/2010 
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Appendix:  Forecasted values for Robustness check:  
Table 23: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Unit Root test 
Table 24: Im, Pesaran and Shin test- Level 
SSS Oil exporting countries Panel Forecasted Data, Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat 
H0: variable has unit root 
      
Variables     T-Stats Prob* 
Borrowing 0.237 0.594 
Corruption -1.060 0.145 
CPI -8.656 0.000 
LINV 3.146 0.999 
LGDP 5.518 1.000 
oil price 6.787 1.000 
DDurable  1.501 0.933 
UN -2.645 0.004 
 
 
  
DOILPRICE DLINV DLGDP DDURABLE DCPI DCORRUPTION DBORROWING DUN
 Mean 3.018            0.075        0.063            0.193             1.145-                   0.000-                   0.692-                  0.047            
 Median 0.414            0.076        0.081            1.000             0.762-                   0.000 0.278-                  0.044            
 Maximum 111.670        1.231        0.778            1.387             1,722.981           2.000                   254.475             7.000            
 Minimum 35.585-          1.883-        2.849-            38.000-           3,925.931-           1.000-                   269.347-             6.800-            
 Std. Dev. 14.416          0.333        0.269            4.262             285.349               0.287                   37.225               0.758            
 Skewness 2.914            0.520-        4.720-            6.778-             8.104-                   1.007                   0.368                  0.642            
 Kurtosis 25.987          9.029        52.505          50.714           140.915               15.458                 24.931               57.437          
 Jarque-Bera 6,373.388     424.163   28,784.820  27,884.240   218,544.900       1,804.850            5,457.201          33,603.240  
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 Sum 820.918        20.377     16.995          52.387           311.390-               0.066-                   188.079-             12.851          
 Sum Sq. Dev. 56,321.260  29.958     19.613          4,923.219     22,065,871.000 22.277                 375,520.200     155.582        
 Observations 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 272
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Table 25: Im, Pesaran and Shin test- 1st Difference 
SSS Oil exporting countries panel data-Forecasted 
Im, Pesaran and Shin 
H0: variable has unit root 
      
Variables     T-Stats Prob* 
Borrowing -13.209 0.000 
Corruption -8.359 0.000 
CPI -8.656 0.000 
LINV -14.079 0.000 
LGDP -10.401 0.000 
oil price -11.809 0.000 
Durable  -11.389 0.000 
UN -5.989 0.000 
 
Table 26: Response of DOILPRICE 
 Impulse response function table and graph for forecasted data      
Period DOILPRICE DLINV DLGDP DUN DDURABLE DCORRUPTION DBORROWING DCPI 
1 14.720 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Prob -0.651 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2 1.474 0.312 -2.058 -0.133 -2.511 -0.8097 -1.401 -0.327 
Prob -1.165 -0.933 -1.618 -0.967 -0.955 -0.973 -1.226 -0.740 
3 -1.595 0.857 -1.355 0.311 -1.080 -0.534 -1.028 -0.674 
Prob -1.536 -0.922 -1.626 -0.985 -0.937 -0.994 -1.260 -0.614 
4 -0.627 0.492 0.229 0.114 -0.105 0.021 -0.292 -0.440 
Prob -0.855 -0.519 -0.687 -0.400 -0.548 -0.675 -0.470 -0.438 
5 0.034 0.347 0.220 0.055 0.083 -0.320 -0.161 -0.289 
Prob -0.507 -0.385 -0.452 -0.318 -0.293 -0.519 -0.315 -0.307 
6 0.041 0.166 0.053 0.106 0.035 -0.216 -0.084 -0.184 
Prob -0.300 -0.237 -0.239 -0.164 -0.159 -0.318 -0.193 -0.193 
7 -0.023 0.205 -0.021 0.104 0.000 -0.154 -0.133 -0.137 
Prob -0.158 -0.204 -0.138 -0.124 -0.078 -0.193 -0.141 -0.135 
8 -0.048 0.132 -0.005 0.070 -0.007 -0.081 -0.083 -0.089 
Prob -0.093 -0.139 -0.077 -0.078 -0.048 -0.105 -0.092 -0.095 
9 -0.024 0.097 0.004 0.038 0.000 -0.065 -0.068 -0.062 
Prob -0.056 -0.099 -0.050 -0.050 -0.033 -0.072 -0.072 -0.072 
10 -0.016 0.061 0.007 0.026 0.001 -0.039 -0.039 -0.040 
Prob -0.037 -0.065 -0.032 -0.033 -0.023 -0.049 -0.046 -0.053 
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Table 27: Response of DLINV: 
 
                 
Period DOILPRICE DLINV DLGDP DUN DDURABLE DCORRUPTION DBORROWING DCPI 
1 0.014 0.322 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Prob -0.020 -0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2 0.043 0.004 -0.011 0.029 0.005 0.050 -0.021 0.012 
Prob -0.025 -0.020 -0.035 -0.021 -0.021 -0.0213 -0.027 -0.016 
3 0.035 0.014 -0.021 0.008 0.003 -0.005 -0.033 0.002 
Prob -0.033 -0.020 -0.036 -0.021 -0.020 -0.022 -0.027 -0.013 
4 -0.013 -0.011 -0.003 -0.008 -0.009 0.004 -0.001 0.000 
Prob -0.017 -0.011 -0.014 -0.008 -0.010 -0.014 -0.011 -0.009 
5 -0.007 0.004 0.002 -0.005 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 
Prob -0.008 -0.008 -0.010 -0.006 -0.006 -0.011 -0.007 -0.008 
6 -0.002 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.004 -0.001 
Prob -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 
7 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
Prob -0.003 -0.005 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 
8 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Prob -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
9 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
Prob -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
10 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Prob -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
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Table 28: Response of DLGDP: 
                  
 Period DOILPRIC
E 
DLINV DLGDP DUN DDURABL
E 
DCORRUPTIO
N 
DBORROWIN
G 
DCPI 
1 0.086 0.064 0.250 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Prob -0.017 -0.016 -0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2 0.013 0.056 -0.017 0.016 -0.010 0.007 -0.006 0.002 
Prob -0.021 -0.017 -0.030 -0.018 -0.017 -0.0179 -0.023 -0.014 
3 0.001 0.027 0.008 0.025 0.008 0.017 -0.014 -0.005 
Prob -0.027 -0.017 -0.030 -0.018 -0.017 -0.018 -0.023 -0.011 
4 0.003 0.005 -0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 -0.008 -0.004 
Prob -0.014 -0.009 -0.012 -0.007 -0.008 -0.012 -0.009 -0.008 
5 -0.001 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 
Prob -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.005 -0.005 -0.009 -0.006 -0.006 
6 -0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 
Prob -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 
7 -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
Prob -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 
8 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
Prob -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
9 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
Prob -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
10 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
Prob -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
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Table 29 Response of DDURABLE: 
                  
Perio
d 
DOILPRIC
E 
DLIN
V 
DLGD
P DUN 
DDURABL
E 
DCORRUPTIO
N 
DBORROWIN
G DCPI 
1 0.269 0.381 -0.023 4.464 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Prob -0.280 -0.280 -0.279 -0.197 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2 -0.060 0.151 -0.423 -0.050 -0.281 0.125 -0.438 -0.050 
Prob -0.350 -0.279 -0.491 -0.291 -0.289 -0.2964 -0.374 -0.225 
3 -0.202 -0.024 0.003 -0.117 0.104 0.027 -0.352 0.068 
Prob -0.447 -0.272 -0.489 -0.293 -0.277 -0.296 -0.374 -0.181 
4 -0.179 0.041 0.086 -0.051 0.042 -0.064 0.043 0.001 
Prob -0.209 -0.140 -0.169 -0.092 -0.126 -0.190 -0.122 -0.110 
5 -0.019 0.003 0.086 -0.044 0.008 0.070 0.021 0.001 
Prob -0.101 -0.102 -0.103 -0.078 -0.059 -0.148 -0.075 -0.084 
6 0.029 0.024 0.031 0.014 0.010 0.011 0.020 0.006 
Prob -0.063 -0.063 -0.052 -0.042 -0.031 -0.076 -0.050 -0.050 
7 0.020 -0.013 -0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.010 0.003 
Prob -0.035 -0.057 -0.028 -0.031 -0.015 -0.051 -0.037 -0.032 
8 0.007 -0.004 -0.008 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.004 0.001 
Prob -0.021 -0.034 -0.015 -0.018 -0.008 -0.025 -0.023 -0.020 
9 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Prob -0.010 -0.025 -0.008 -0.011 -0.004 -0.016 -0.019 -0.013 
10 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Prob -0.006 -0.015 -0.004 -0.007 -0.002 -0.009 -0.010 -0.009 
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Table 30 Response of DCORRUPTION: 
                  
 
Period DOILPRICE DLINV DLGDP DUN DDURABLE DCORRUPTION DBORROWING DCPI 
1 0.010 -0.001 0.012 0.011 0.283 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Prob -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 -0.013 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2 -0.004 -0.024 -0.018 0.015 0.088 -0.003 -0.004 -0.018 
Prob -0.023 -0.018 -0.031 -0.019 -0.019 -0.0187 -0.024 -0.014 
3 -0.017 -0.026 0.004 -0.016 -0.004 -0.017 0.010 -0.013 
Prob -0.031 -0.018 -0.031 -0.019 -0.019 -0.020 -0.025 -0.012 
4 -0.006 -0.006 0.003 -0.008 -0.008 -0.020 0.005 -0.007 
Prob -0.019 -0.011 -0.014 -0.008 -0.012 -0.013 -0.008 -0.010 
5 -0.001 0.005 0.001 0.004 -0.001 -0.007 0.002 -0.003 
Prob -0.009 -0.008 -0.010 -0.006 -0.005 -0.010 -0.007 -0.008 
6 0.001 0.007 -0.001 0.005 0.000 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 
Prob -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.007 -0.004 -0.005 
7 0.000 0.003 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 
Prob -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 
8 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
Prob -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
9 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
Prob -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
10 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Prob -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
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Table 31 Response of DBORROWING: 
                  
Period DOILPRICE DLINV DLGDP DUN DDURABLE DCORRUPTION DBORROWING DCPI 
1 -2.039 -8.344 -8.129 1.523 0.489 34.415 0.000 0.000 
Prob -2.275 -2.243 -2.183 -2.152 -2.151 -1.521 0.000 0.000 
2 -0.056 -2.076 5.494 -2.133 0.267 -3.216 3.515 -3.129 
Prob -2.871 -2.298 -3.995 -2.376 -2.360 -2.4172 -3.039 -1.835 
3 2.276 
-
10.739 -0.048 -4.194 -0.155 -2.117 5.164 -1.388 
Prob -3.646 -2.325 -4.084 -2.436 -2.301 -2.455 -3.076 -1.509 
4 1.092 0.237 -0.773 0.486 0.260 -3.535 -0.052 -1.282 
Prob -2.000 -1.442 -2.052 -1.202 -1.259 -1.807 -1.625 -1.031 
5 -1.018 0.067 -0.782 0.925 -0.401 -0.773 0.783 -0.559 
Prob -1.613 -1.148 -1.652 -1.040 -0.994 -1.520 -1.248 -0.901 
6 -0.013 0.914 -0.428 0.433 0.041 -0.716 -0.872 -0.416 
Prob -0.917 -0.713 -0.825 -0.490 -0.518 -0.841 -0.681 -0.504 
7 -0.148 0.232 -0.080 0.265 0.016 -0.161 -0.148 -0.103 
Prob -0.500 -0.582 -0.478 -0.350 -0.263 -0.663 -0.430 -0.373 
8 -0.076 0.343 -0.036 0.039 -0.003 -0.250 -0.328 -0.136 
Prob -0.314 -0.347 -0.294 -0.217 -0.159 -0.346 -0.294 -0.193 
9 -0.103 0.127 0.045 0.054 -0.013 0.005 -0.061 -0.054 
Prob -0.164 -0.280 -0.141 -0.131 -0.080 -0.231 -0.198 -0.130 
10 -0.021 0.148 0.034 0.028 0.003 -0.064 -0.089 -0.059 
Prob -0.090 -0.162 -0.093 -0.080 -0.049 -0.111 -0.119 -0.072 
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Table 32: Response of DUN: 
         
 
Period DOILPRICE DLINV DLGDP DUN DDURABLE DCORRUPTION DBORROWING DCPI 
1 0.160 -0.038 0.352 -0.033 0.011 0.096 0.621 0.000 
 -0.046 -0.045 -0.042 -0.039 -0.039 -0.039 -0.027 0.000 
2 0.290 -0.045 -0.121 -0.004 0.035 -0.007 -0.086 -0.009 
 -0.060 -0.046 -0.081 -0.048 -0.048 -0.0489 -0.062 -0.037 
3 0.031 -0.055 -0.078 0.076 0.000 -0.013 0.041 0.017 
 -0.076 -0.049 -0.088 -0.052 -0.050 -0.053 -0.067 -0.034 
4 -0.025 -0.011 -0.050 -0.023 -0.019 -0.035 -0.038 -0.012 
 -0.046 -0.031 -0.045 -0.026 -0.027 -0.038 -0.035 -0.021 
5 -0.025 -0.012 0.000 -0.005 -0.006 0.010 0.005 0.003 
 -0.026 -0.021 -0.025 -0.016 -0.016 -0.029 -0.018 -0.017 
6 -0.004 0.009 0.006 -0.004 0.000 -0.010 -0.001 -0.002 
 -0.016 -0.014 -0.016 -0.010 -0.009 -0.017 -0.014 -0.010 
7 0.002 -0.004 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.005 0.002 
 -0.009 -0.011 -0.008 -0.006 -0.004 -0.012 -0.008 -0.006 
8 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 
 -0.005 -0.007 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 
9 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 -0.003 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 
10 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
  -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
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Table 33: Response of CPI 
         
Period DOILPRICE DLINV DLGDP DUN DDURABLE DCORRUPTION DBORROWING DCPI 
1 8.909 45.861 -0.838 -7.970 -16.947 -64.579 1.284 194.327 
 -13.174 -13.011 -12.852 -12.847 -12.821 -12.477 -12.146 -8.588 
2 -0.566 -5.107 -54.900 -8.852 12.202 -1.404 -15.265 118.898 
 -18.323 -15.387 -24.312 -15.544 -15.453 -15.7600 -19.057 -11.825 
3 -5.322 -14.105 -2.250 -19.404 3.108 145.730 -3.160 92.602 
 -28.023 -18.534 -28.005 -19.345 -18.908 -18.415 -21.627 -11.321 
4 -0.995 -21.959 16.674 -29.561 -1.392 72.100 21.376 56.438 
 -25.331 -16.218 -24.831 -15.545 -17.345 -17.195 -18.164 -13.330 
5 15.045 -57.807 12.325 -32.497 1.164 52.583 34.949 38.122 
 -23.935 -15.183 -22.733 -14.294 -14.814 -15.744 -17.262 -12.348 
6 15.175 -35.561 3.633 -18.731 1.785 25.675 23.284 23.687 
 -18.670 -12.062 -16.698 -10.124 -11.846 -13.228 -12.059 -11.899 
7 6.503 -28.154 -0.716 -11.034 -0.533 17.526 20.150 15.750 
 -14.210 -10.354 -13.825 -8.450 -9.222 -11.145 -10.253 -10.736 
8 5.036 -17.435 -2.079 -7.168 -0.074 9.995 10.937 10.151 
 -9.589 -8.019 -9.043 -5.711 -6.437 -8.744 -6.644 -9.097 
9 2.798 -12.492 -1.527 -4.539 -0.110 6.947 8.163 7.228 
 -6.046 -6.569 -6.351 -4.363 -4.352 -7.188 -5.182 -7.521 
10 1.864 -7.867 -1.208 -3.298 -0.086 4.181 4.777 4.821 
  -3.784 -5.187 -3.975 -3.210 -2.825 -5.519 -3.741 -5.908 
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Figure 11: Response to Structure One S.D. Innovations  
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Variance Decomposition table and Graph Results for forecasted data  
 
Table 34: Variance Decomposition of LGDP: 
          
Period S.E. LGDP LINV DURABLE CORRUPTION UN CPI BORROWING OIL_PRICE 
1 0.273 100.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 
2 0.393 97.370 2.162 0.183 0.032 0.013 0.006 0.060 0.1445 
3 0.499 94.460 4.030 0.821 0.025 0.112 0.007 0.334 0.14101 
4 0.587 92.635 5.115 1.151 0.037 0.2267 0.010 0.558 0.16696 
5 0.664 91.746 5.623 1.267 0.050 0.319 0.011 0.668 0.17771 
6 0.733 91.228 5.943 1.302 0.057 0.379 0.012 0.733 0.17753 
7 0.797 90.869 6.183 1.318 0.062 0.416 0.013 0.775 0.17339 
8 0.856 90.596 6.365 1.335 0.065 0.441 0.013 0.806 0.17159 
9 0.911 90.381 6.505 1.351 0.066 0.461 0.013 0.833 0.17183 
10 0.963 90.208 6.615 1.364 0.067 0.478 0.014 0.855 0.17253 
 
Table 35: Variance Decomposition of LINV: 
          
 
Period S.E. LGDP LINV DURABLE CORRUPTION UN CPI BORROWING OIL_PRICE 
1 0.323 6.100 93.900 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 
2 0.467 5.984 91.407 0.478 0.040 0.050 0.011 1.242 0.76538 
3 0.591 5.540 88.886 0.804 0.070 0.523 0.025 1.687 2.3626 
4 0.686 5.149 87.909 0.829 0.055 0.7629 0.021 2.097 2.98501 
5 0.771 5.030 87.353 0.769 0.043 0.935 0.024 2.371 3.18902 
6 0.847 5.009 87.131 0.737 0.037 1.004 0.021 2.422 3.29529 
7 0.918 4.971 86.947 0.722 0.033 1.065 0.018 2.445 3.41544 
8 0.984 4.932 86.805 0.715 0.029 1.117 0.016 2.484 3.49209 
9 1.046 4.901 86.704 0.710 0.026 1.159 0.015 2.515 3.53913 
10 1.105 4.880 86.622 0.704 0.023 1.192 0.014 2.539 3.57651 
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Table 36: Variance Decomposition of DURABLE: 
          
 
Period S.E. LGDP LINV DURABLE CORRUPTION UN CPI BORROWING OIL_PRICE 
1 4.513 0.116 0.675 99.209 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 
2 6.401 0.186 1.281 97.726 0.212 0.430 0.042 0.090 0.03283 
3 7.799 0.261 1.451 96.590 0.189 1.253 0.058 0.169 0.02639 
4 8.977 0.280 1.564 96.033 0.180 1.6307 0.061 0.162 0.08447 
5 9.994 0.265 1.634 95.697 0.173 1.850 0.067 0.167 0.14341 
6 10.919 0.242 1.711 95.472 0.162 1.981 0.068 0.175 0.18294 
7 11.774 0.225 1.762 95.329 0.152 2.068 0.070 0.181 0.20745 
8 12.569 0.212 1.798 95.223 0.143 2.135 0.072 0.188 0.22396 
9 13.316 0.202 1.826 95.140 0.135 2.189 0.073 0.192 0.23771 
10 14.023 0.194 1.847 95.075 0.129 2.231 0.074 0.195 0.24891 
 
 
Table 37: Variance Decomposition of CORRUPTION 
          
 
Period S.E. LGDP LINV DURABLE CORRUPTION UN CPI BORROWING OIL_PRICE 
1 0.264 0.320 0.129 0.083 98.023 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 
2 0.420 0.150 0.792 0.291 92.779 0.047 0.340 0.249 0.0264 
3 0.520 0.109 2.537 0.192 88.919 0.033 0.671 0.483 0.01885 
4 0.588 0.096 4.892 0.152 83.773 0.0421 1.052 0.867 0.16521 
5 0.640 0.090 7.221 0.242 77.581 0.104 1.529 1.433 0.65447 
6 0.686 0.110 9.285 0.582 71.117 0.168 1.997 2.025 1.49372 
7 0.728 0.173 11.017 1.117 65.116 0.204 2.376 2.506 2.47748 
8 0.767 0.272 12.399 1.707 59.954 0.216 2.676 2.871 3.38698 
9 0.804 0.381 13.473 2.262 55.693 0.216 2.915 3.152 4.12303 
10 0.839 0.483 14.320 2.744 52.221 0.211 3.105 3.370 4.69457 
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Table 38: Variance Decomposition of UN: 
          
Period S.E. LGDP LINV DURABLE CORRUPTION UN CPI BORROWING OIL_PRICE 
1 0.744 24.215 2.806 0.168 0.000 72.792 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2 1.055 21.842 3.460 0.112 0.104 65.164 0.000 0.013 9.288 
3 1.315 17.889 4.318 0.288 0.099 63.396 0.017 0.013 13.949 
4 1.506 15.428 4.923 0.312 0.077 62.289 0.013 0.027 16.886 
5 1.675 13.794 5.466 0.317 0.088 61.959 0.011 0.025 18.285 
6 1.826 12.746 5.737 0.329 0.130 61.674 0.010 0.037 19.260 
7 1.968 11.919 5.974 0.356 0.180 61.422 0.009 0.039 20.003 
8 2.100 11.313 6.115 0.387 0.226 61.182 0.008 0.038 20.618 
9 2.225 10.823 6.236 0.414 0.265 61.001 0.007 0.037 21.090 
10 2.343 10.429 6.336 0.436 0.295 60.847 0.007 0.037 21.477 
 
Table 39: Variance Decomposition of CPI: 
          
Period S.E. LGDP LINV DURABLE CORRUPTION UN CPI BORROWING OIL_PRICE 
1 212.510 0.496 4.238 0.227 1.085 0.351 92.812 0.000 0.000 
2 259.992 2.726 2.835 0.322 0.758 0.843 86.371 5.132 0.479 
3 330.456 1.739 2.251 0.603 0.849 0.789 56.697 36.266 0.298 
4 368.540 2.023 2.594 1.198 0.757 1.603 52.042 38.744 0.245 
5 405.094 1.697 4.842 1.854 0.688 2.540 49.566 36.861 0.588 
6 436.209 1.475 5.251 2.414 0.752 2.803 48.193 36.742 0.742 
7 463.517 1.312 5.373 2.733 0.874 3.069 47.294 36.911 0.706 
8 490.133 1.183 5.545 2.995 1.009 3.248 46.466 37.031 0.692 
9 515.733 1.080 5.707 3.240 1.118 3.394 45.809 37.050 0.689 
10 540.126 0.994 5.860 3.454 1.203 3.522 45.195 37.106 0.685 
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Table 40: Variance Decomposition of BORROWING: 
          
Period S.E. LGDP LINV DURABLE CORRUPTION UN CPI BORROWING OIL_PRICE 
1 35.764 7.909 2.932 0.272 1.443 2.305 5.828 78.008 0.000 
2 48.090 5.334 5.466 0.156 2.964 4.689 6.490 72.997 0.158 
3 60.408 4.845 13.784 0.621 3.846 8.145 5.950 59.717 0.110 
4 69.305 4.738 16.940 1.376 5.281 9.686 5.300 52.705 0.087 
5 77.119 4.977 18.390 1.860 6.863 10.856 4.892 47.812 0.104 
6 84.389 5.049 18.965 2.208 8.425 11.437 4.628 44.719 0.135 
7 91.179 5.043 19.365 2.481 9.686 11.870 4.409 42.446 0.165 
8 97.631 5.017 19.750 2.712 10.606 12.185 4.253 40.689 0.180 
9 103.727 4.978 20.072 2.897 11.259 12.449 4.139 39.354 0.189 
10 109.456 4.948 20.358 3.039 11.729 12.684 4.052 38.295 0.193 
 
 
Table 41: Variance Decomposition of OIL_PRICE: 
          
Period S.E. LGDP LINV DURABLE CORRUPTION UN CPI BORROWING OIL_PRICE 
1 14.846 10.023 0.165 0.261 0.036 0.355 0.323 0.171 88.622 
2 22.454 6.763 0.073 0.226 0.810 0.216 0.395 0.103 91.369 
3 27.552 5.004 0.263 0.281 1.516 0.511 0.350 0.070 91.815 
4 31.583 4.230 0.551 0.309 1.934 0.758 0.347 0.055 91.534 
5 35.126 3.815 0.853 0.318 2.092 0.980 0.395 0.066 91.146 
6 38.300 3.550 1.088 0.322 2.098 1.152 0.428 0.065 90.919 
7 41.182 3.396 1.301 0.317 2.041 1.291 0.449 0.061 90.725 
8 43.841 3.299 1.460 0.306 1.969 1.391 0.466 0.059 90.595 
9 46.343 3.232 1.581 0.293 1.897 1.466 0.482 0.058 90.503 
10 48.711 3.181 1.679 0.281 1.832 1.525 0.494 0.057 90.433 
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Figure 7: Variance Decomposition (Combined Graph) 
 
i See Gottschalk (2001) for a comprehensive review of the appropriateness of the SVAR Methodology as a useful 
tool in identifying and modelling the behaviour of macroeconomic variables to unexpected shocks. 
                                                          
